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Scientific Jury Selection And The Equal
Protection Rights of Venire Persons

Jeffrey J. Rachlinski*

Jury trials have always been a source of anxiety for litigators.
Despite years of preparation, the outcome of a case can turn on the
whimsical biases of a group of people who may or may not
understand the legal arguments involved. In recent years, attorneys
have taken steps to reduce this uncertainty by hiring social
scientists who study jury decision making. One of the most popular
services which these consultants offer is assistance in the jury

selection process.' The use of sociological and psychological
methods in identifying and excluding unfavorable jurors from
service, known as Scientific Jury Selection ("SJS"), has been
growing for decades.2 As a private litigation aid, SJS has remained

*
Department of Psychology, Stanford University, Stanford, California. The author benefitted
from the generous assistance of Thomas Lyon and David Rosenhan.
1. See generally VALEmE P. HANs & NaL VmmAR, JUDGiNG THE JURY 79-95 (1986);
Valerie P. Hans, Jury Decision Making, in HANDBOOK Op LAW & PSYCHOLOGY, at 61, 62-64 (D.
K. Kagehiro & W. S. Laufer, eds. 1992); James D. Herbsleb et al., When PsychologistsAid in the
Voir Dire:LegalandEthicalConsiderations,in SocIAL PSYCHOLOGY AND DIScRETIONARY LAW 197
(Lawrence E. Abt & Irving R. Stuart eds., 1979); John Berman & Bruce D. Sales, A Critical
Evaluation of the Systematic Approach to Jury Selection, 4 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 219 (1977);
Margaret Covington, Jury Selection: Innovative Approaches to Both Civil and CriminalLitigation,
16 ST. MARY'S L. J. 575, 590-95 (1985); Shari Seidman Diamond, Scientific Jury Selection: What
Social Scientists Know and DoiNot Know, 73 JUDICATURE 178 (Dec.-Jan. 1990); Michael J. Saks,
The Limits of ScientificJury Selection: Ethicaland Empirical, 17 Jumrmmrcs J. 3 (1976); John L.
Wanamaker, Note, Computersand Scientific Jury Selection: A Calculated Risk, 55 U. DaT. J. URB.
L. 345, 350-51 (1978).
2.
Stephen J. Adler, Litigation Science: Consultants Dope Out the Mysteries of Jurorsfor
Clients Being Sued, WALL ST. J., Oct. 24, 1989, at 1; Diane Burch Beckham, The Art of Voir Dire:
Is it Really a Science?: Community Surveys, Focus Groups Used More in Jury Selection, NEw
JERsEY L. J., July 5, 1990, at 5; Charles Bremner, Oddballs of the Jury, Tm TIMES, Sept. 2, 1991,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, paper file; Robert D. Minick, Using Jury Consultants in Voir
Dire, MAss. LAW. WKLY., Dec. 9, 1991, at S2; Emily Couric, Jury Sleuths: In Search of the Perfect
Panel, NAT'L L. J., July 21, 1986, at 1 (stating that jury consulting has experienced "Geometric"
growth); Gail D. Cox, Consultants to the Stars, They Deploy an Army of 100+ Ph.D.s, NAT'L L. J.,
May 29, 1989, at 26; Judith Dancoff, Hidden Persuadersof the Courtroom,BARtISTER, Winter 1985,
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unregulated and unsupervised.' The Supreme Court's recent cases
on equal protection and peremptory challenges, including Batson
v. Kentucky,4 however, suggest that SJS may face increased
scrutiny by the courts. These cases hold that a litigant may not use
the race of the venire persons as a justification for peremptory
challenges. Since SJS has consistently relied on observable
characteristics such as race,' litigants risk crossing the

at 8; James Gray, Can You Really Predict What a JurorWill Think?, MED. ECON., Sept. 23, 1985,
at 136; Richard Greene, Jury Tampering,FORBES, Nov. 5, 1984, at 214; Morton Hunt, PuttingJuries
on the Couch, NEw YORK TIMES MAG., Nov. 28, 1982, at 70; Jury Science; Psychodrama,THE
ECONOMIST, July 8, 1989, at 86; Monique Parson, Jury Consulting Standing Trial With Attorneys,
Bus. INS., Aug. 21, 1989, at 3; Tamar Lewin, Jury Research: Growing Field,8 Soc. ACTION & L.,
May-June 1980, at 50. John H. Kennedy, PretrialStudying of Jurors:Becomes a Key to the Case,
THE BoSTON GLOBE, Feb. 19, 1990, at 1.
3.
See infra note 13 and accompanying text (discussing the lack of supervision of SJS).
4.
476 U.S. 79 (1986). See infra Section I1I.
5.
DONALD E. VINSON & PHIUIP K. ANTHONY, SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH METHODS FOR
LIrATION, SS. 1-6, 4-1, 4-2, 4-3 (1985); Berman & Sales, supra note 1; Covington, supra note 1,
at 576; Brian L. Cutler, Introductionto the Status of ScientificJury Selection in Psychology andLaw,
3 FoRENsIc REP. 227, 229 (1990); Solomon M. Fulero & Steven D. Penrod, Attorney Jury Selection
Folklore: What Do They Think and How Can Psychologists Help?, 3 FoRENsic REP. 233, 234
(1990); Hans, supra note 1, at 62-63; Reid Hastie, Is Attorney-Conducted Voir Dire an Effective
Procedurefor the Selection ofImpartialJuries?,40 AM. U. L. REV. 703, 718; Irwin A. Horowitz,
Juror Selection: A Comparison of Two Methods in Several Criminal Trials, 10 J. APPLIED Soc.
PSYcHOL. 86, 88 (1980); Neal Miller, Facts, Expert Facts, and Statistics: Descriptive and
ExperimentalResearchMethods in Litigation,40 RUTGERS L. REV. 467,490 (1987) ('The most cited
social science technique used for jury selection is the sample survey"); Saks, supra note 1,at 6-7;
Richard L. Moskitis, Note, The ConstitutionalNeed for Discovery of Pre Voir Dire Juror Studies,
49 Sp. CAL. L. REv. 597, 605-07 (1976); Wanamaker, supra note 1, at 350-51; Adler, supra note
2 at 1; Beckham, supra note 2, at 5; Diane Burch Beckham, Voir Dire Voodoo; Consultants Make
New Inroads,TEX. LAw., Apr. 30, 1990, at I (noting that demographic predictors often do not predict
as well as other variables); Couric, supra note 2; Dancoff, supra note 2 at 52-53; Amitai Etzioni,
Creatingan Imbalance, TRIAL, Nov.-Dec. 1974, at 28; Gray, supra note 2, at 136; Greene, supra
note 2, at 214; Hunt, supra note 2, at 70; Saul M. Kassin, Mock Jury Trials, 7 TRAIL DIPL. J. 26
(1984); Lewin, supra note 2, at 50; Minick, supra note 2, at 52; Howard A. Moore, Jr., Redressing
the Balance, TRIAL, Nov.-Dec. 1974, at 29; Parsons, supra note 2, at 3; Pre-TrialResearch: "The
Insurer'sInsurance, 32 BEsT's REV. 32 (1983); Michael J. Saks, Social Scientists Can'tRig Juries,
PSYCHOL TODAY, Jan. 1976, at 60; Roberta W. Shell, Scientific Jury Selection: Does it Work?,
BARRISTER, Sum. 1980, at 46; Jay Schulman et al., Recipe for a Jury, PSYCHOL. TODAY, May 1973,
at 37; Curtis J. Sitomer, Jury Tapping Sniffs ofTampering, CHUS71AN SC. MONITOR, Sept. 7, 1989,
at 13. But see Bremner, supra, note 2 (stating that the Supreme Court has declared the use of race
and gender unconstitutional); Cox, supranote 2, at 26 (no mention of race); Gail Diane Cox, Delving
Into Juror'sMinds; Questionaires,Once a High Stakes Tactic, Enter Into the Mainstream, NAT'L
L. J., Jan. 21, 1991, at I (stating that the use of juror questionnaires avoids the need to rely on
demographic characteristics); Kevin Dunne, Drawing a Line Between Art and Mythology, THE
RECORDER, Feb. 21, 1991, at 6 (stating that many modem consultants do not believe that
demographic characteristics predict juror bias); John H. Kennedy, PretrialStanding of Jurors;
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constitutional limits by hiring an SJS consultant. Even if the SJS
consultant uses permissible characteristics, the process itself may
raise the scrutiny of a court.' This paper discusses the possibility
that the new scrutiny applied to peremptory challenges in general
endangers the continued use of SJS.
Part I discusses SJS and how its methods rely on classifications
such as race. Part II reviews that history of constitutional
challenges to jury selection procedures, and Part Ill relates this
history to SJS. Part IV describes several arguments that might
exempt SJS from this new scrutiny. Part V details the possibility
that classifications other than race might be attacked by future
courts, thereby further undermining the basis for SJS. Part VI
concludes that while SJS may remain a useful tool, litigators would
be wise to weigh its benefits against its possible liabilities before
hiring an SJS consultant.
I. SJS IN GENERAL

SJS is not selection at all. Rather, it takes advantage of a
litigant's power to exclude a specific number of potential jurors
from service on the jury panel.7 Litigants exercise these
exclusions, called peremptory challenges, based on a limited
amount of information about the potential jurors, such as their
gender, race, occupation, age and marital status. While attorneys
rely on intuition or personal experiences in deciding which venire
persons to strike from service, an SJS consultant uses empirical
research to ascertain which observable characteristics mark venire

Becomes Key to the Cases, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 19, 1990, at I (no reference to the use of
demographic predictors, although it contains only a cursory description of the services used). Even
though some references fail to describe the use of demographic predictors, most describe one of the
jury service firms in particular, which states in its brochure that demographic predictors are poor
predictors of bias, but still uses such predictors in combination with other predictors. See BROCHURE
OF LTIGATION SCIENCES INC. (1988) (on file with author).

6. See infra notes 137-148 and accompanying text (discussing SJS's susceptibility to
constitutional challenge).
7. For a summary of SJS methods, see infra Section II; HANs & VrDMAR, supra note 1, at
79-95; Hans, supra note 1, at 62-63; Covington, supra note 1, at 590-95; Hastie, supra note 5, at
717-721 (1990); Wanamaker, supra note 1, at 346-52.
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persons with undesirable attitudes or biases. With over three8
hundred individuals or firms currently offering these services,
social science consultation for jury trials has grown into a two
hundred million dollar a year industry. 9 By some accounts, in
nearly every jury trial involving significant stakes, one or more
parties has hired an SJS consultant.'0
Despite its impact on large scale litigation, SJS remains almost
completely unregulated. 1 Since an SJS consultant advises an
attorney on how to use peremptory challenges, and these require
almost no explanation to judge., the source of the advice also need
not be divulged. Furthermore, although attorneys are constrained by
ethics codes, SJS consultants are usually not members of the bar,
and, hence, are not bound by them. Indeed, no professional code or
licensing procedure for SJS consulting currently exists. Unlike
almost all other pre-trial activities, neither formal nor informal
procedures govern the work of an SJS consultant. The inherent
supervisory power of a court grants judges the authority to regulate
the activities of a consultant,12 but courts have rarely utilized this

8.
Hans, supra note 1, at 63.
9.
Gail Appleson, CorporationsLook to Surrogate Juries in Big Cases, THE RtrrERs
BusiNEsS REPORT, June 5, 1989, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Business file.
10. Kennedy, supra note 5, at 1. Scientific jury selection is unquestionably widespread. In a
recent informal survey I questioned fourteen large law firms from New York City, all reported that
someone in their firm had recently used a psychological consultant for trial preparation. Several firms
exist which are dedicated entirely to performing such services, and many individuals in the law and
psychology field report that they have been hired as consultants. See, e.g, Kassin, supra note 5, at
26. One of the psychological litigation firms employs over 100 people, and claims to have worked
on over 1000 cases and lists literally all of the country's biggest and best law firms as past clients,
Cox, supra note 2, at 22.
11. See Herbsleb et al., supra note 1, at 200; Moskitis, supra note 5, at 605-07; Wanamaker,
supra note 1, at 350-51.
12. Several courts have used their power to control the discovery of information about jurors
and venire persons. See, e.g., Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S. 749, 764-66 (1929) (condemning
the hiring of a private detective to follow the jurors); Wilkerson v. Johnson, 699 F.2d 325, 330 (6th
Cir. 1983) (trial judge may refuse post-trial interviews with jurors); Commonwealth v. Allen, 400
N.E.2d 229, 232-239 (Mass. 1980) (trial judge may prohibit interviews with neighbors of venire
persons); United States v. Barnes, 604 F.2d 121, 142-43 (2d Cir.1979) (jurors names may be withheld
from the defense). The current trend is to permit investigation of the venire persons so long as the
investigation will not involve direct contact with jurors or potential jurors. See, e.g., United States
v. Costello, 255 F.2d 876, 882-84 (2d Cir.) (government may investigate Internal Revenue Service
files for names of venire persons) cert. denied, 357 U.S. 937 (1958), reh'g denied, 358 U.S. 859
(1958); Dow v. Carnegie-Illinois Steel Corp., 224 F.2d 414,430-31 (3d Cir. 1955) (investigation of
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authority.13 Part of SJS's appeal may arise from this immunity
from court or opponent scrutiny.
II. THE METHODS USED IN SJS

There are probably as many different methods of SJS as there
are SJS consultants, but they all share some basic features. Like
conventional jury selection, SJS has, as its primary goal, the
identification of jurors who will respond unfavorably to one's case.
However, SJS uses empirical data, rather than intuition, to
determine which jurors will be hostile. An SJS consultant will
generally use a statistical procedure called regression analysis14 to

develop a model of desirable and undesirable jurors. Applying this
model to the pool of venire persons tells the SJS consultant
whether a venire person is likely to make a friendly or hostile

juror. Many critics have argued that it is a useless procedure and
confers no advantage, 5 but as stated above, it has found

jurors is proper so long as the reasonable tendency of the activity is not to intimidate jurors) cert.
denied 350 U.S. 971 (1956). At least one court has declared that pre-trial interviews with neighbors
are "a smart move, and a practice of all good lawyers." Salt Lake City v. Pipenburg, 571 P.2d 1299,
1300 (Utah 1977). Limitations on investigation typically arise out of concern that the investigation
will lead to direct contact with the actual venire persons or will otherwise violate privacy rights of

the venire persons. See generally Joshua Okun, InvestigationofJurorsBy Counsel: Its Impact on the
Decisional Process,56 GEo. L. J.839 (1968).
13. See United States v. Lehder-Rivas, 669 F. Supp. 1563, 1566-69 (M.D. Fla. 1987) (court
issued an injunction prohibiting the defendant and his consultants from conducting mock trials or
survey research). The Lehder-Rivas court at frst declared that if the purposes of the survey were to
find evidence to support a motion to change venire, then the defendant would have a First
Amendment right to conduct a community survey. Il at 1566. After allowing the frst survey,
however, the court refused to allow a second. IMt at 1567. The court argued that surveys designed to
assist counsel in jury selection have no First Amendment merit, I It also held that the Sixth
Amendment does not require that courts permit such a survey. IL at 1567-68. The court then
determined that since the defendant could use such surveys and mock trials to create publicity and
interfere with the proper administration of justice, it could properly issue an injunction against their
use pursuant to the supervisory power of the court, Id at 1569. Thus, according to Lehder-Rivas,
surveys and mock trials have no constitutional value, and judges are free to enjoin them, although
they rarely do so. See also Kieman v. Van Schaik, 347 F.2d 775,780 (3d Cir. 1965) (availability of
jury surveillance groups may not correct inadequate voir dire).
14. See infra note 30 and accompanying text (discussing regression analysis).
15. See, e.g., HANs & VIMmAR,supra note 1, at 79-95; Hans, supra note 1, at 63; Saks, supra
note 1, at 13-21; Adler, supra note 2, at 1; Beckham, supra note 2, at 5; Gray, supra note 2, at 136;
Greene, supranote 2, at 214; Hunt, supranote 2, at 70; Parson, supra note 2, at 3; Saks, supra note
5, at 60.
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widespread acceptance throughout the legal community. Others
have attacked it as unethical, unconstitutional and illegal, but,
outside of the equal protection challenges described later in this
paper, SJS probably does not violate rules for ethical lawyering.t6
A. The Data Used in SJS Consulting
As discussed, SJS relies on empiricism. Attorneys often have
theories of how members of various groups might decide cases, but
these theories are only intuitive guesses. SJS starts with these
guesses, and proceeds to test their veracity.
Before collecting data, the SJS consultant must determine which
psychological characteristics a favorable or unfavorable juror will
possess. In some cases, a well defined psychological variable will
accurately predict juror verdicts. For example, psychologists believe
that the extent to which individuals identify with or support
authority figures can predict juror's reactions to criminal trials.17
This characteristic, known as authoritarianism, is well researched,
and it probably successfully predicts juror's responses to cases

involving authority figures. 8 In other cases, the consultant may
have to define or create a new measurement device. In a large
anti-trust case, for example, no obvious variable may correlate with
favoring a plaintiff or defendant. An SJS consultant may have to

16. See, e.g., Herbsleb et. al, supra note 1, at 197; Moskitis, supra note 5, at 605-07; Etzioni,
supra note 5, at 28.
17. Herman E. Mitchell & Donna B. Byrne, The Defendant's Dilemma: Effects of Juror's
Attitudes and Authoritarianismon JudicialDecisions, 25 J. PERSONALrrY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 123,
125-26 (1973); Horowitz, supra note 5, at 88.

18.

High authoritarians tend to submit more readily to authority figures, and also tend to

express rejection and prejudice towards ethnic and racial groups other than their own. They tend to
be more punitive towards lawbreakers and accept few excuses for such behaviors. Various
authoritarian scales exist, and typically include such items as: "1o you believe that the most

important social virtues are obedience and respect for authority?" and "Do you believe that what our
youth need most is strict discipline and rugged determination?" The original work on authoritarianism
comes from TREoDoRE W. AoR'o Er AL., Thn AuTHoRrrARLAN PEMSONALITY (1950). See also,
David G. Myers, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 397-99 (4th ed. 1993) (brief summary of work on the
authoritarian personality).
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conduct some initial research to create an attitude scale 19 or some
other measurement devise which predicts a verdict preference. Such
research would normally consist of showing a large number of
people an abbreviated version of the case, and correlating their
reactions to the new attitude scale.
If the attitude scale which the SJS consultant plans to use to
discern favorable jurors is short, an SJS consultant may not need
to collect further data. An attorney could simply administer the
attitude scale to the venire persons during voir dire. The prospects
of actually being able to do this are remote, especially in
jurisdictions where voir dire is conducted by the judge.20 A judge
will not allow an attorney to administer the attitude scale since
these scales tend to be lengthy, and appear to ask irrelevant
questions. Recently, some state courts have begun to allow the
litigants to prepare a series of questions which venire persons can
answer in pencil and paper form.2 1 This innovation would allow
an SJS consultant to measure the attitudes directly. Under these
circumstances, an SJS consultant need do nothing more than
determine which measurable attitudes will best predict verdicts and
include the attitude scale in the venire questionnaire.
In most cases, judges restrict voir dire, and the SJS consultant
will have to make guesses as to which venire persons hold the
desired attitudes. This requires that SJS consultants conduct the
community surveys which are the hallmark of SJS. In such a
survey, the SJS consultant will administer the relevant attitude
19. Attitude scales consist generally of a series of questions which relate to a central, core
attitude. The aggregate set of responses to these questions reflects the extent to which a respondent
endorses the core attitude. See, e.g., Myers, supra note 18, at 112-16. For example, an SJS consultant
defending a polluter against a toxic tort suit might want to measure the extent to which potential
jurors espouse environmental concerns. The consultant could do this by creating an "environmentalism scale," which consist of a series of questions such as "do you believe that global warming
is a serious threat to the world's climate?" and "Do you believe that endangered species should be
protected even if it hurts the economy and costs jobs?." The consultant will combine the responses
to these questions into a single score, which presumably predicts the individual's response to

allegations of a toxic tort.
20. This is the case in nearly all federal venues. Gordon Bermant & John Shapard, The Voir
Dire Examination, JurorChallenges,andAdversary Advocacy, in THE TRIAL PROCESs 69 (Bruce D.
Sales ed., 1981); GORDON BERMANT, JuRy SELEaTION PROCEDLuRFS IN UNITED STATES DIsTRICT
CoURTs 11-13 (Fed. Jud. Center 1982).
21. See, e.g., Cox, supra note 2, at 1.
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measurement over the telephone along with several questions
concerning characteristics which are likely to correlate with the
attitude scale. These characteristics should correspond to
information that the consultant can observe in the venire persons
at trial. The community survey will typically include questions
concerning race, gender, age, education, occupation, political
beliefs, or anything which can both be easily assessed in the venire
persons and will correlate with the target attitude. The consultant
will use the survey data to determine which characteristics mark
jurors who have the target attitude. The attorney who has hired the
consultant can use this information to determine which venire
persons to strike with peremptory challenges.
The efficacy of such a procedure in identifying unfavorable
jurors is weak, at best. With a restricted voir dire, the SJS
consultant must make two statistical inferences. First, the
consultant's power to identify unfavorable jurors is limited by the
correlation between the target attitude and the final verdict. Even
a powerful variable like authoritarianism fails to account for a large
number of verdict choices.22 Second, the community survey data
will not perfectly determine which venire persons even have the
target attitude. In fact, the literature on SJS contains several
examples of the failure of the procedure to accurately identify the
attitudes of venire persons.23 Regardless, experts on jury decision
making seem to agree that the procedure can confer a marginal
advantage to a litigant.24 One expert has stated that if used
consistently in every case, SJS probably would increase a litigator's
chances of success by about five percent.25 Despite its

22. See supra note 18 (discussing authoritarianism).
23. See, e.g., HANs & ViDMAR, supra note 1, at 85 (describing an elaborate jury selection
procedure in an early case of SJS which misidentified a young female student as an extremely
favorable juror for the defense, when in fact, she made the strongest arguments for the prosecution
during deliberation); Hans Zeisel & Shari Seidman Diamond, TheJury Selection in the Mitchell-Stans
Conspiracy Trial, 1 AM. B. FOUND. Rca. J. 151, 162-66 (1976) (describing the overwhelming prodefense position of a juror whom the SJS consultants for the defense thought would be least

favorable).
24.
at 178.
25.
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disadvantages, the reasons why attorneys continue to rely on SJS

in cases involving multiple millions of dollars is obvious. When
substantial assets are on the line, an attorney tries to gain every
advantage, no matter how marginal. Even though SJS has its limits
when it must rely on community surveys, litigants involved in
costly suits prefer to use this data over their intuition.
B. Using the Survey Data
SJS surveys will frequently uncover several characteristics
which correlate with the targeted attitude. For example, imagine
that the consultant has been hired by a criminal defendant, who is
trying to identify jurors who score high on the authoritarianism
scale. The survey data might show that, in the relevant venue, older
citizens are more authoritarian than younger, and that Latinos score
higher than all other racial groups.26 Further suppose that the
consultant analyzes other data, such as gender and marital status,
but that these variables do not correlate with authoritarianism. This
data has already told the consultant a great deal. It shows that the
defense should probably direct its peremptory challenges at older
citizens and at Latinos. Furthermore, it suggests that the other
characteristics which do not correlate with the target attitude, and
should be ignored during voir dire.27 As the early SJS consultants
observed, the correlations between global attitude measures and
demographic characteristics vary between communities, and must
therefore be measured anew with each different venue.28
In this hypothetical scenario, the consultant will want to glean
more information out of this survey data. She will want to assess
the data for interactions between any of the individual relationships.
Although the data already shows two clear relationships, it may be
more helpful to analyze the combined effect of the two

26.

Higher in that the groups are more inclined to identify with authority figures than those

who score lower on the scale.
27. Although this may be more complicated. See infra notes 29-32 and accompanying text
(discussion of interaction effects).
28. HANs & VIDMAR, supra note 1, at 87, This is part of what makes SJS so expensive. These
surveys must be repeated for each attitude in each new venue, and may even change over time. ld.
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characteristics. Rather than thinking of them as two separate
categories, the consultant will assess four different groups: older
Latinos, younger Latinos, older non-Latinos, and younger
non-Latinos. This analysis may show, for example, that although
as a group Latinos are more authoritarian than non-Latinos, in this
particular community, the entire effect may be driven by a
tendency for older Latinos to be much more authoritarian than
younger Latinos. Also, it could be that younger non-Latinos are
similar to older non-Latinos, and that overall, the effect is driven
by the extreme position of the older Latinos.
Analysis of these interactions might also alter the analysis of
some of the characteristics which did not distinguish high and low
authoritarians. In the example, assume that the consultant found
that neither gender nor education correlates with authoritarianism
in the sample. This finding does not mean that the two variables
are entirely useless as predictors. If highly educated males are more
authoritarian than all of the females, who in turn are more
authoritarian than the less educated males, then neither gender nor
education alone will be useful predictors. The consultant can,
however, use this combination as a basis to advise the defendant to
strike as many highly educated males as possible.
In addition to flushing out the characteristics which distinguish
high authoritarians, the consultant must assess the size of the effect.
Since the number of peremptories is limited,29 the consultant will
want to target those characteristics which correlate with
authoritarianism most strongly. The consultant will want to
combine the effects of several of these characteristics into a single
weighing function.
Returning to the original description of the data, if Latinos are
more authoritarian than non-Latinos, older citizens are not more

29. In federal court, parties in a civil case are allowad three peremptory challenges each. 28
U.S.C. § 1870 (1992). In a criminal case, the number varies with the penalty, each side is allowed
three if the crime is punishable by less than 1 year in prison, and each gets twenty in a capital case.
For crimes in between, the prosecutor gets six and the defense gets ten. FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(b). Each

state has its own rules on peremptory challenges. California, for example, allows six for each side
in civil cases, twenty each for capital cases, and ten each for lesser offenses. CAL. Cv. PRoc. CODE
§ 231 (West Supp. 1993).
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authoritarian than younger, and these effects do not interact, then
the consultant must know how to combine and compare these two

effects. The SJS consultant will have to give advice as to whether
it would be more useful to strike an older venire person who is not
Latino or whether to strike a Latino venire person who is not old.
In effect, the consultant must use the survey data to derive an
equation which will weigh the characteristics of all of the venire
persons according to the likelihood that they will support the
client's case.
In order to combine the data into a single equation, the SJS
consultant will use a mathematical technique known as multiple
regression analysis? Multiple regression permits the SJS
consultant to score the effect of each variable on a single scale.
The final product of the regression analysis will be an equation
which tells the consultant how to weigh each of the jurors'
characteristics. The equation will give no weight to any of the
characteristics which do not distinguish high and low authoritarians.
The model will also weigh each of the characteristics that do
matter according to the size of the relationship it bears to the target
attitude.
The SJS consultant will use the regression equation derived
from the survey data to assess the predilections of the potential
jurors. The equation will give each venire person a unique score
that allows the attorney to compare them against each other. In our
hypothetical venire, if the data shows that Latinos are much more
authoritarian than non-Latinos, that older people are slightly more
authoritarian than younger, that these two effects do not interact,
and no other effects matter, the regression equation is simple and
straightforward. The equation will score the potential jurors in
terms of these two characteristics. Older Latino jurors will score
highest followed by younger Latinos, older non-Latinos, and

30. For a full description of the technique, see JACOB COHEN & PATRICIA COHEN, APPLIED
MULTIPLE REOR.SSiON/CORRELATION ANALYSIS FOR THE BEHAVIORAL SctENcEs (2d ed. 1983).
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younger non-Latinos. 3 Usually, the consultant will have to
compile several of these variables in order to provide a relatively
determinant piece of advice for the litigant.32
C. The Role of Suspect Classifications
The interdependent nature of the characteristics in the
regression equation makes assessing the effect of a single
classification problematic. In the hypothetical above, suppose that
the consultant had found a correlation between authoritarianism and
both being a Latino and being older, and therefore advised the
litigator to strike older Latinos. Is the attorney's use of a
peremptory challenge against an older Latino venire person
unconstitutional? One could argue that it is not unconstitutional
because the challenge was motivated both by a forbidden
classification, Latino versus non-Latino, and by an acceptable
classification, age. Since it was not entirely a product of racial
distinctions, the consultant could argue that it respects the
Fourteenth Amendment rights of the venire persons. 3 This answer
must be incorrect, however, since it ignores the important role that
the unconstitutional category played in the analysis. If the
consultant had not used race, then the litigant may have used the
peremptory challenge on a different venire person.
Determining the specific effect of the forbidden classification
depends upon the results of the survey data. If the survey data

31. SJS consultants may also factor in some consideration of the potential dynamics of the
jury. Being aware that high status jurors, such as those with high socio-economic status or some

expertise in the case, have more influence on the verdict than low status jurors, consultants will pay
special attention to the high status jurors. See, e.g., HANs & VnMARt supra note I, at 85-86. Thus,
if the regression equation indicates that a high status juror is likely to support the adversary's
position, SJS consultants will be sure to try to strike this venire person.
32. Although, in the example provided, the characteristics arc scored as dichotomous, a
consultant may use a continuous measure for further refinement. For example, age can be scored as
either dichotomous, with some cutoff age dividing "older" from "younger" people, or as continuous,

which involves entering the exact age into the equation.
33.

Age is not a suspect classification demanding heightened scrutiny under the Equal

Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427
U.S. 307, 312-14 (1976). But classifications involving Latinos are subject to such scrutiny, and are
usually unconstitutional. See, e.g., Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 495 (1977).
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showed that both age and race predict authoritarianism, but do not
interact with each other, then the impact of race is straightforward.
The regression equation will have a specific term in its model for
the weight it gives to race. To generate the set of advice that a
consultant would have provided without using race, one need only
take the term out of the equation and recalculate the predictions.
For example, in the case where race and age contribute
independently to the effect, one could easily recreate the advice
given without race in the equation. The consultant would have
simply suggested striking older venire persons, and not necessarily
older Latino venire persons. Since this is obviously a much larger
group, the attorney would resort to intuition and hunches to
exercise the remaining challenges.
If the regression equation were more complex, however, the
results could be more striking. Assume that the consultant discovers
that race, age, and education all predicted authoritarianism. Further
suppose that race is the most powerful predictor, followed closely
by age and that education is the weakest predictor. These
circumstances would lead the consultant to the advice described in
Table 1.
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TABLE 1

Hypothetical Models of SJS With and Without Race
for Eight Venire Persons and Three
Peremptories by the Defendant

V.P. Education

I
2
3

Model 2 3
(Race Not Included)

Model 12
(Race Included)

V.P. Characteristics
Age

Race

Priority
Score

Strike?

1

Prity
Score

Strike?

I

College

Older

Latino

9

Y

4

?

2

College

Older

Other

4

N

4

?

3

College

Young

Laino

5

N

0

N

4

College

Young

Other

0

N

0

N

5

No College

Older

Latino

11

Y

6

Y

6

No College

Older

Other

6

N

6

Y

7

No College

Young

Latino

7

Y

2

N

8

No College

Young

Other

2

N

2

N

Strike the three venlre persons with the highest priority scores.
Priority Score - add 5 for Latino, add 4 for older, add 2 for non-college educated.
Priority Score - add 4 for older, add 2 for non-college educated.

Table 1 shows the application of the hypothetical data to eight
venire persons who each have a unique combination of the three
relevant attributes. Using model 1, which includes an analysis of
the race of the venire persons, the consultant would advise the
defendant to strike both of the older Latinos and the younger
Latino without a college education. If the consultant refrains from
analyzing the correlation between race and authoritarianism, the
consultant will follow model 2, and advise the attorney to strike
both older venire persons without college educations, and will be
indifferent to striking either of the older, college educated venire
persons. The older Latino without a college education will not
make the jury in either case, and it is therefore unlikely that her

constitutional rights have been violated if the consultant uses model
1510
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1. For the younger Latino without a college education, however,
the two models mean the difference between serving and being
struck. In the case of this juror, it is difficult to see how a
consultant could argue that the use of multiple classifications
34
satisfies Batson's prohibition.
To generalize from this example, including a constitutionally
forbidden category in the analysis will tend to create a different
pattern of strikes when race is weighted more heavily than other
variables. As the example illustrates, however, this heuristic method
will not complete the analysis. Determining when the use of the
category will make the difference between using a challenge and
not necessitates a thorough review of the consultant's equations and
survey data combined with an assessment of the characteristics of
venire members.
Until recently, this kind of advice was immune from judicial
scrutiny. No judge need worry about conducting the analysis used
in the consulting example above. The recent history of
constitutional law, as applied to peremptory challenges, however,
suggests that many of the demographic techniques used in SJS are
not only ethically objectionable, but are also constitutionally
impermissible.
III. THE CONSTITUTION AND PEREMPrORY CHALLENGES
In the past few years, the climate surrounding peremptory
challenges has changed dramatically. Beginning with Batson v.
Kentucky,3" the United States Supreme Court has held that the

34. Interaction effects present only a slightly more complex analysis. If neither race nor age
mean anything by themselves, but a particular age-race combination correlates with the target attitude,
then race must be treated as an indispensable component of the analysis.
35.
476 U.S. 79 (1986). For reviews of the Batson decision, see Albert W. Alschuler, The

Supreme Court and the Jury: Voir Dire, Peremptory Challenges,and the Review of Jury Verdicts,
56 U. Ciii. L. REv. 153, 167-211 (1989); Douglas L. Colbert, Challenging the Challenge: The
Thirteenth Amendment as a ProhibitionAgainst the Racial Use of Peremptory Challenges, 76
CoRNiL L. REv. 1, 93-101 (1990); William T. Pizzi, Batson v. Kentucky: Curing the Disease But
Killing the Patient,1987 SuP. Cr. Ray. 971, 138-44 (1987) (arguing that Batson adds too much to
the cost of conducting a trial); Barbara D. Underwood, Ending Race Discriminationin Jury Selection.
Whose Right is itAnyway?, 92 COLUM. L. Ray. 725,725-26 (1992); Gerard G. Brew, Note, The Civil
Implications of Batson v. Kentucky and State v. Gihnore: A Further Look at Limitations on the
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Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the use of peremptory challenges
on the basis of a venire person's race.36 Although the Batson
Court limited its prohibition to a prosecutor's use of challenges
against members of a cognizable class,37 recent cases have
38
extended the holding. In Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co.,
the Court held that civil litigants may not exclude jurors from
40
service because of their race.39 The Court, in Powers v. Ohio
also relaxed limitations on standing to raise a Batson claim against
a peremptory challenge.4 The Court completed the proscription
in Georgia v. McCollum42 by requiring that criminal defendants
to refrain from indulging in race-based peremptories.43 After
Batson, Edmonson, Powers, and McCollum, any party, criminal or
civil, defendant or plaintiff, of any race may not use race as a basis
for exercising a peremptory challenge. These cases also raise the
possibility that the use of other suspect classifications such as
gender, religion or ethnicity, are also forbidden by Batson and its
progeny."
Constitutional scrutiny of the demographic composition of the
jury takes two general forms--challenges to the selection of citizens
for the venire and challenges to the selection of jurors from the
venire. Each issue implicates both the Fourteenth Amendment equal
protection rights of the venire persons and the Sixth Amendment
due process rights of defendants in criminal trials. 45 Despite a
46
vigorous application of both amendments to venire composition,

Peremptory Challenge, 40 RuTGERS L. REv. 891, 919-69 (1988); Jonathon B. Mintz, Note, Batson
v. Kentucky: A Half Step in the Right Direction (RacialDiscriminationand PeremptoryChallenges
Under the Heavier Confines of Equal Protection),72 CORNE.LL L. REv. 1026, 1031-38 (1987).

36.
37.

Batson, 476 U.S. at 97.
Id at 96.

38.
39.

111 S. Ct. 2077 (1991).
Id. at 2087.

40.

111 S. Ct. 1364 (1991).

41. Id at 1373-74.
42. 112 S. Ct. 2348 (1992).
43. Id at 2356.
44. See infra Section V. B..
45. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
46. For a review of these cases, see Jon M. Van Dyke, JURY SELECTION PROCEDVRES: OUR
UNCERTAIN COmmmENT TO REPREsENTATIvE PANELs 85-110 (1977).
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the peremptory challenge remained immune from constitutional
scrutiny until Batson v. Kentucky. 47 In Batson, the Court held that
by excluding venire persons on the basis of their race, the
prosecutor violated the Fourteenth Amendment rights of the
excluded venire persons. 48 Although the Court now prohibits
prosecutors from using peremptory challenges to exclude jurors on
the basis of race, the prohibition arises from the Fourteenth
Amendment's Equal Protection Clause and not the Sixth
Amendment's requirement of a representative jury. The Court has
arrived at this conclusion only after several attempts to balance
peremptory challenges against constitutional requirements.49
A. Early History of Racial Discrimination and the Sixth
Amendment
Beginning with Strauder v. West Virginia,50 the United States
Supreme Court has held that the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits
states from excluding citizens from jury service on the basis of
their race. 5 ' In Strauder, the Supreme Court relied on the
amendment's Equal Protection Clause to strike down a West
Virginia statute which explicitly excluded blacks from jury
service. 52 Similarly, in Neal v. Delaware,53 the Court overturned
a race neutral jury selection statute administered in a discriminatory
fashion.54 The Court declared that it would tolerate neither explicit
nor implicit schemes which resulted in a complete elimination of
blacks' opportunity to serve as jurors. 55

47.
48.

476 U.S. 79 (1986).
Id. at 97.

49.

See infra notes 301-310 and accompanying text (discussing the balancing of constitutional

values with the benefits of peremptory challenges).
50. 100 U.S. 303 (1879).
51. Id. at 309.
52. Id.
53. 103 U.S. 370 (1879).
54. Id. at 397. Although the Delaware juror selection statute did not discriminate against
blacks explicitly, its state officials simply refused to allow blacks to serve on juries. Id
55. Id
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It took the Court another fifty-five years to extend the scope of
the Equal Protection Clause to cover jury selection schemes that
reduce, but do not eliminate, the eligibility of blacks to serve in
venire panels. In Norris v. Alabama,56 the Court asserted that a
defendant could make out a prima facie case of discriminatory
intent if he could demonstrate that a jury selection procedure
results in substantial underrepresentation of blacks in the jury
venire." After such a showing, the prosecution must provide an
acceptable race-neutral explanation for the disparity or the district
court must assume that the scheme violates the Sixth and
Fourteenth Amendment rights of the defendant.58 In more recent
cases, the Court has closely scrutinized states' explanations for
racially unrepresentative jury venires. 59 The Court has held that
the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments require that jury service
statutes employ selection mechanisms designed to produce
representative jury venires.'
The Court has balked at extending the above rulings to the use
of peremptory challenges. In Swain v. Alabama,6 the Court
refused to overturn the conviction of a defendant who objected to
a prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges to exclude black
jurors. 62 The defendant in Swain claimed that the Sixth
Amendment and the Strauder precedent prohibited a prosecutor
from using peremptory challenges in a calculated attempt to
eliminate black jurors.63 While agreeing that the Sixth
Amendment requires that the defendant's jury be drawn from a
venire which contains a representative cross section of the
community, the Court held that a defendant is not entitled to a

56. 294 U.S. 587 (1935).
57. Id. at 591-593.
58. I& at 597-99. For a more detailed account of the early cases dealing with Fourteenth
Amendment challenges to the composition of the venire, see*VAN DYKE, supra note 46, at 85-100

(1977).
59. See, e.g., Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 492-500 (1977); Carter v. Jury Comm'n of
Greene County, 396 U.S. 320, 330 (1970); Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559, 561-62 (1953).
60. But some commentators criticize these cases by noting that jury venires still fail to
represent the community adequately. See, e.g., VAN DYKF, supra note 46, at 156-60.
61. 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
62. Id. at 226-28.
63. Id. at 226.
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perfect cross section on the ultimate jury.' Writing for the
majority, Justice White's opinion defers to the cherished place
unexplained peremptory challenges have occupied in the history of
American law.65 He asserted that a prima facie case of
discriminatory use of peremptory challenges could only be made
if a defendant can demonstrate a long-standing pattern of
systematic exclusion.'
Swain preserved the status of peremptory challenges as
unexplained strikes. This holding prevented lower courts from
delving into the motivations for peremptory challenges in specific
cases and instead required them to focus on the behavior of a
prosecutor across a large number of cases. The Court ostensibly
preserved the Sixth Amendment rights of the defendant by allowing
lower courts to review historic evidence for a pattern of systematic
exclusion. In practice, however, Swain had little effect on racism
in jury selection.67 Upon reviewing the facts in Swain, Justice
White could not find sufficient evidence to support a prima facie
case of racial discrimination, 68 even though the venue, Talladega
County, Alabama, had never seen a black juror.69 Many
commentators concluded that no pattern of abuse would satisfy the
Court's test.7" Indeed, despite numerous attempts, only two
defendants since Swain have managed to demonstrate a prima facie
case of discriminatory use of peremptory challenges violating the
Sixth Amendment.71

64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
exclusion
71.
1979).

Id at 208.
Id at 212-222.
I at 223-24.
See, e.g., VAN DYKE, supra note 46, at 150-52.
Swain, 380 U.S. at 227.
Id. at 223.
VAN DYKE, supra note 46, at 156-60. One court labeled the attempts to prove systematic
as "mission impossible." McCray v. Abrams, 750 F.2d 1113, 1120 (2d Cir. 1984).
See State v. Brown, 371 So. 2d 751 (La. 1979); State v. Washington, 375 So. 2d 1162 (La.
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B. Questioning Peremptory Motivations: Batson v. Kentucky
Having effectively eliminated Sixth Amendment attacks on
peremptory challenges, the Court revisited this issue in Batson v.
Kentucky.72 In Batson, a black defendant had been convicted by
an all-white jury in a county which had not seated a black juror in
over a decade. Rather than overruling Swain, the Court relied on
the Fourteenth Amendment to overturn Batson's conviction.73
Writing for the majority, Justice Powell upheld the overwhelming
burden of proof Swain created for a Sixth Amendment
cross-section complaint.74 Batson held that the Kentucky
prosecutor's use of race-based peremptory challenges violated the
venire persons' guarantee of equal protection under the Fourteenth
Amendment. 75 Furthermore, the Court ruled that because of the
low probability that excluded venire persons will raise a case to
defend their rights to serve, and because of the special relationship
between the accused and the jurors, the defendant had standing to
raise the constitutional claims of excluded venire persons.76 The
Court's decision in Swain makes it virtually impossible for a
defendant to attack race-based peremptory challenges with the
Sixth Amendment. After Batson, however, a criminal defendant has
special standing to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment rights of the
venire persons.77
The Batson Court reached its decision by reference to Strauder
and its progeny.7" The Court affirmed its position that although a
criminal defendant has no right to be tried by a jury which is
composed of persons of his own race,7 9 the Equal Protection
Clause does give him "[tihe right to be tried by a jury whose

72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
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Id. at 92-93.
IX at 93.
Id. at 89.
Id.
Alschuler, supra note 35, at 167-73.
Batson, 476 U.S. at 85-100.
Id. at 85 (quoting Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 305 (1880)),
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members are selected pursuant to non-discriminatory criteria. '' 80
Furthermore, in the Batson majority, Justice Powell asserted that
discrimination in the selection of jurors harms the community and
the rights of the venire persons as well as the rights of the
defendant.81 Powell wrote that "[t]he State may not draw up its
jury lists pursuant to neutral procedures but then resort to
discrimination at other stages in the selection process." 2 Thus, the
Batson Court held that although peremptories normally stand as
unexplained challenges, the Fourteenth Amendment requires that on
occasion, the state divulge its motivations to ensure that race does
not factor into the selection process.
Batson also describes those circumstances in which the
Fourteenth Amendment demands a race-neutral explanation from
a prosecutor. A prosecutor must provide an explanation for a
peremptory challenge if the defendant can demonstrate a prima
facie case of purposeful discrimination in selection of the petit
jury." To make out a prima facie case under Batson, the
defendant must "show that he is a member of a cognizable racial
group, and that the prosecutor has exercised challenges to remove
from the venire members of the defendant's race. ' '8 4 The
defendant may rely upon the fact that peremptory challenges make
discrimination possible for those who are "of a mind to
discriminate."85 Finally, the defendant must show that the
circumstances surrounding the use of the peremptory challenge
suffice to "[r]aise an inference that the prosecutor used that practice
to exclude the veniremen from the petit jury on account of their
race. ' 86 In determining whether the facts justify an inference of
discrimination, Batson directs district courts to assess the "totality
of the circumstances" surrounding the exercise of the challenges.8 7

80.
U.S. 339,
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Id4at 85-86 (citing Martin v. Texas, 200 U.S. 316, 321 (1906)); Ex parte Virginia, 100
345 (1880).
Batson, 476 U.S. at 87.
Id.
14 at 97.
Id at 96.
Id (quoting Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559, 562 (1953)).
Id
Id at 96-97.
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This totality includes, but is not limited to, scrutiny of the
statements made by the prosecutor, questions asked during voir dire
and the pattern of strikes used by the prosecutor.88 Once the
defendant makes a prima facie case, a prosecutor may defend the
challenges by providing an acceptable race-neutral explanation for
the strike or strikes. 9
Although it created a means of attacking peremptory challenges,
the Batson Court limited the scope of its decision. First, the
opinion explicitly restricts the challenge to strikes against members
of "cognizable racial groups." 9 Batson involved black venire
persons, but later courts extended protection to include other
groups, such as Latinos91 and Native Americans. 92 Batson
challenges based on other demographic characteristics, however,
such as ethnicity or gender have not fared as well in lower
courts.93 Second, Batson reserves the challenge for defendants
who share the race of the excluded venire person. 94 This
limitation lead several lower courts to reject attempts by whites to
raise a Batson claim when the prosecutor struck black venire
persons. 95 Finally, the Batson majority consistently refers to
prosecutors, leading some courts to infer that Batson does not apply
to civil trials,96 or to a defendant's peremptory challenges. 97

88.

Ad4 at 97.

89. Id
90. Id at 96 (quoting Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482,494 (1977)) (defining "cognizable
racial group").
91. See, e.g., Hernandez v. New York, 111 S. Ct. 1859, 1866-67 (1991).

92.

United States v. Bedonie, 913 F.2d 782, 794-95 (10th Cir. 1990); United States v. Roan

Eagle, 867 F.2d 436,441 (8th Cir. 1989); United States v. Chalan, 812 F.2d 1302,1313-14 (10th Cir.

1987).
93. See infra notes 247-300 and accompanying text (discussing lower courts treatment of
gender and ethnicity oriented claims).
94. Batson, 476 U.S. at 96.
95. See, e.g., United States v. Anguilo, 847 F.2d 956, 959 (1st Cir. 1988).
96. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 895 F.2d 218 (5th Cir. 1990) (en banc), rev'd, 111
S. Ct. 2077, 2081 (1991).

97.
(1992).
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C. Extending Batson: Powers, Edmonson and McCollum.
In the 1990 term, the Supreme Court had the opportunity to
reassess Batson's limitations. In Powers v. Ohio,9 a white
defendant objected to a prosecutor's peremptory challenges to black
venire persons, demanding that the judge compel an explanation for
the challenges.99 Powers, a white man accused of murder in
Franklin County, Ohio, protested the prosecution's use of
peremptory challenges against seven black venire persons."
Powers demanded that the prosecutor provide a race-neutral
explanation for these challenges, but the trial court ignored his
objection."'1 Powers was convicted and he appealed."12 On
review, the Supreme Court held that Powers had standing, despite
the fact that his race did not match that of the challenged
jurors."0 3 In arriving at its conclusion, the Court relied on much
of the rationale supporting Batson. Quoting Batson, the majority
opinion explains that when race serves as a basis for peremptory
challenges, the entire community suffers."° The court explained
that "Batson recognized that a prosecutor's discriminatory use of
peremptory challenges harms the excluded jurors and the
community at large."' ' Since the harm to the venire persons and
the community does not depend on the race of the defendant, any
defendant may assert standing to challenge the prosecutor's actions.
Although the defendant's race might bear upon an inference of
racial motivation, it cannot now preclude standing to raise the
issue.' 6 The Powers decision, therefore, condemns race-based
peremptories in any form, for any cause.

98. 111 S. Ct. 1364 (1991).
99. Id at 1366.
100. Id
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id at 1373-74.
104. Id at 1368.
105. Id (citing Batson, 476 U.S. 79, 87) (the Court expressed the concern that biased jury
selection procedures "undermine public confidence in the fairness of our system of justice").
106. Id at 1373.
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Similar logic underlies the Court's expansion of Batson to civil
trials in Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co."17 In Edmonson, a
black plaintiff filed a personal injury suit against the Leesville
Concrete Company."' During jury selection, the defendant used
two of his statutorily allowed three peremptory challenges to
exclude black venire persons." 9 Citing Batson, Edmonson's
attorney demanded that the defendant articulate a race-neutral
reason for their use of these two challenges."' With the backing
of the district court, the defendant refused, and the trial court
eventually impanelled one black and eleven white jurors."1
Edmonson received a favorable verdict, but the jury declared him
eighty percent responsible for his injuries and thereby awarding
him only twenty percent, or $18,000, of his damages."' On
appeal, Edmonson argued that Batson should apply to civil as well
as criminal trials. 3 After the Fifth Circuit, en banc, agreed with
the trial court,"

Edmonson appealed to the Supreme Court. The

Court reversed the Fifth Circuit and remanded the case for a
determination as to whether Edmonson could make out a prima
facie case of racial discrimination." 5
The Court had two hurdles to clear before it could extend the
Batson rule to civil trials--the state action limitation on the
Fourteenth Amendment and the standing of a civil litigant to raise
constitutional rights of venire persons. In order to invoke the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, an individual
must have suffered disparate treatment at the hands of a state
official or someone acting under the color of state action. 16
Batson does not address this issue, since a prosecutor falls well

107. 111 S. CL 2077 (1991).
108. Id at 2080.
109. kd at 2081.
110. Id
111. Id
112. Id
113. Id
114. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 895 F.2d 218 (5th Cir. 1990) (en banc), rev'd, 111
S. Ct. 2077, 2081 (1991).
115. Edmonson, 111 S. Ct. at 2081.
116. Id at 2082.
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within the ambit of state action." 7 The defendant in Edmonson
argued that civil litigants are private actors who need not answer
to the Fourteenth Amendment in any aspect of case
preparation.'
Writing for the majority in Edmonson, Justice
Kennedy characterized civil litigants as partial state actors." 9 He
argued that since peremptory challenges require the machinery of
a court, exercise of such challenges closely approximates state
action. 20 Kennedy relied upon a close analogy between the use
of peremptory challenges and the hiring decisions of other
government officials.' Kennedy noted that if the government
gave a private body power to choose government employees or
officials, such a private body would be bound by the principle of
race-neutrality. 22 Kennedy argued that, in choosing a jury, both
the government and the private litigants have the same goal. 23
The substantial entanglement between the litigants and the
government, which occurs during jury selection, led the Edmonson
majority to conclude that the exercise of peremptory challenges
constitutes sufficient state action to require Fourteenth Amendment
scrutiny. 124

Once past the state action barrier, the Edmonson Court
considered whether a civil litigant could raise the equal protection
claims of the excluded jurors."z Comparing the civil and criminal
spheres, the Court found no differences in the three elements which
allow a litigant to raise the equal protection claim. 26 The Court
first noted that Powers, which held that persons who were excluded
from jury service were effectively unable to protect their own

117. See, e.g., Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 608 (1985) (holding that prosecutorial
discretion must comport with the constraints of the Equal Protection Clause.)
118. Edmonson, 111 S. Ct. at 2081.
119. Id at 2082-87.
120. Id
121. Id at 2085-86.
122. Id at 2085 (citing National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 192-93
(1988); Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982)).
123. Id at 2086.
124. Id
125. Id at 2087.
126.

Id
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rights, also applied to civil trials.127 Similarly, the Court held that
the relationship between the excluded venire persons and the
litigant challenging the exclusion was as close in the civil context
as in a criminal context.12 Finally, the Court recognized that a
civil litigant is harmed by an opponent's discriminatory use of
peremptory challenges since such challenges implicate that the
judicial process is less than fair.12 9 Convinced that a civil litigant
facing race-based peremptory challenges satisfies these
requirements for third party standing, the Court held that courts
must hear challenges brought by private litigants regarding racially
discriminatory peremptory challenges in civil trials.13
Similar considerations lead the Court to extend Batson's
prohibition against race-based perenptories to criminal defendants.
In Georgia v. McCollum,' the Court distinguished earlier
precedent, which held that, in the ordinary course of their
32
representation, criminal defense attorneys are not state actors.1
The McCollum Court held that defense attorneys can be state
actors, depending upon the nature of the activity they are
performing. 133 Writing for the majority, Justice Blackmun relied
on the similarity between state hiring decisions and peremptory
challenges: the same argument Justice Kennedy used in Edmonson.
After rejecting arguments that defendants have different status than
civil litigants, 34 the Court held that prosecuting attorneys have

127. Id.
128. Id
129. Id. (quoting Powers v. Ohio, 111 S. Ct. 1364, 1365 (1991); Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S.
545, 556 (1979)).
130. Id at 2088.
131. 112 S. Ct. 2348 (1992).
132. Id at 2355 (citing Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312 (1981)).
133. Id
134. For a full discussion of the relevant issues, see Katherine Goldwasser, Limiting a Criminal
Defendant's Use of Peremptory Challenges: On Symmetry and the Jury in a Criminal Trial, 102
HARV. L. REV. 808 (1989) (concluding that Batson should not apply to a criminal defendant's
peremptory challenges); J. Alexander Tanford, Racism in the Adversary System: The Defendant's Use
of Peremptory Challenges, 63 So. CAL. L. REV. 1015 (1990) (concluding that both legal and
normative arguments exist for extending Batson to criminal defendants); John J. Hoefner, Note,
Defendant'sDiscriminatoryUse of PeremptoryChallengesAfterBatson v. Kentucky, 62 ST. JOHN'S
L. REv. 46 (1987) (concluding that Batson should apply to criminal defendants); E. Vaughn
Dunnigan, Note, Discriminationby the Defense: Peremptory ChallengesAfter Batson v. Kentucky,
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sufficient standing to raise the Fourteenth Amendment rights of the
venire persons. 35 Although four justices questioned the wisdom
' the opinion
of the Court's new line of post-Batson precedent, 36
echoes Edmonson and Powers, and re-affirms these holdings.
Thus, the Court has expanded the rights of those summoned for
jury duty. After Powers, Edmonson, and McCollum, the Equal
Protection Clause protects all venire persons from being excluded
from service on the basis of their race.
IV. EDMONSON, POWERS, MCCOLLUM AND

SCIENTIFIC JURY SELECTION
None of the hundreds of appeals resulting from Batson involves
SJS. Like Batson, most of these cases are appeals from peremptory
challenges exercised by prosecutors, a group which seldom uses
SJS. Now that the Supreme Court has forbidden race-based
peremptories in civil cases and by defense attorneys, SJS may
result in some case law. Some of the unique characteristics of a
peremptory challenge originating from an SJS consultant make it
particularly likely to draw the attention of a court. Although these
peculiarities also raise questions concerning the applicability of the
Batson case to SJS methods, SJS probably does not escape
constitutional scrutiny.
A. Special Difficulties Raised By SJS
Under the new Supreme Court cases, Batson challenges present
two unique problems for SJS consultants and their clients. First,
since SJS has a history of using race as a marker in demographic

88 COLUM. L. Rnv. 355 (1988) (arguing that the Equal Protection Clause and community beliefs in
fair trials requires that Batson extend to criminal defendants); Michael Sullivan, Note, The
Prosecutor'sRight to Object to a Defendant's Abuse of Peremptory Challenges, 93 DICK. L. REV.
143 (1988) (concluding that Batson applies to criminal defendants).
135. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. at 2356.
136. Justices O'Connor, Scalia, and Thomas dissented outright, while Chief Justice Rehnquist
concurred only insofar as the result followed from Batson and Edmonson, which he believes should
be overturned.
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surveys which support peremptory challenges, 137 the mere fact of
employment of an SJS consultant can raise the presumption of
unconstitutional, race-based peremptory challenges. This objection
could result in intense judicial scrutiny of the basis for peremptory
challenges. Second, SJS creates a paper trail for a court to follow.
The attorney employing an SJS consultant who has used race in a
demographic survey will be hard pressed to avoid a successful
Batson challenge. Without SJS, the attorney is free to point out
characteristics of challenged venire persons other than race and to
assert that race played no part. 13' Forced to disclose the results
of a demographic survey which includes race, an attorney could not
credibly make such a claim.
1. Raising the Inference of Race Based Challenges
As a first step in challenging a peremptory challenge under
Batson, a litigant must make a prima facie showing that the
opponent has used peremptory challenges to eliminate venire
persons on the basis of their race. 139 In determining whether the
litigant has adduced evidence sufficient to support such a showing,
trial courts should consider the circumstances surrounding the
exercise of the peremptory challenges. 4 ' Much of the litigation
resulting from Batson concerns the nature of the initial showing
which would constitute a prima facie case of discriminatory use of
peremptory challenges. 4 ' The Supreme Court has consistently

deferred to the lower courts for litigation which fleshes out the
facts needed to support a prima facie claim.'42 In implementing

137. Virtually every published description of SJS describes its reliance on such surveys. See
supra note 5 (providing authorities discussing SJS methodology).
138. Many have criticized Batson's enforcement scheme because of the opportunity it affords
prosecutors to invent pretextual justifications for overtly race-based peremptory challenges. See, e.g.,
Alsehuler, supra note 35, at 199-201; Mintz, supra note 35, at 1036-38.
139. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96 (1986).
140. Id at 97.
141. See Alschuler, supra note 35, at 170-73.
142. Batson, 476 U.S. at 97 ("We have confidence that trial judges, experienced in supervising
voir dire, will be able to decide if the circumstances concerning the prosecutor's use of peremptory
challenges creates a prima facie case of discrimination against black jurors."); Powers v. Ohio, 11
S. Ct. 1364, 1374 (1991) ("It remains for trial courts to develop rules, without unnecessary disruption
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Batson, lower courts have used a variety of methods to determine
when a defendant has made out a prima facie claim of
discrimination, which can include holding hearings and examining
evidence, such as a prosecutor's notes during voir dire. Courts have
held that the failure to inquire into the basis for peremptory
challenges with sufficient vigor can constitute reversible error. 43
Such rulings oblige trial courts to engage in a reasonably diligent
inquiry into the basis for a Batson challenge.
In the case of SJS, diligent inquiry could require a judge to
delve into the details of the psychological consultation. Even with
the publications available on SJS, the public catches only glimpses
of the details of SJS methods. SJS consultants rarely disclose the
results of their investigations and procedures in academic and
professional journals. Client confidentiality also obfuscates a real
understanding of SJS. Given SJS's history, when faced with
evidence that an attorney has employed an SJS consultant, the trial
judge faces a situation where the best guess is that the peremptory
challenges result in part from the race of venire persons."'
Diligent inquiry requires that a judge demand to see the results of
the SJS consultation. Thus, a litigant employing SJS should be
prepared to disclose the results of this research to the judge.145

of the jury selection process, to permit legitimate and well-founded objections to the use of
peremptory challenges as a mask for race prejudice").
143. See, e.g., United States v. Alcantar, 897 F.2d 436, 440 (9th Cir. 1990) (failure to hold
hearing to determine motive for peremptory challenge when prima facie case had been made held to
be reversible error).
144. Although SJS consultants hide the details of their activities, they often reveal their
activities to the public as occurred in the William Kennedy Smith case. See David Margolick, Palm
Beach Rape Trial Faces Test: Finding Jury, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31, 1991, at 18.
145. The work-product doctrine, which protects an attorney's preparations for litigation,
probably shields the details of SJS consulting from an opponent's scrutiny. See, e.g., Herbsleb et al.,
supra note 1, at 204-05 (concluding that the results of SJS are protected). But see Moskitis, supra
note 5, at 630-33 (concluding that juror studies fall within the "unfair prejudice" exception to work
product). This shield, if it exists, would not bar an in camera examination of SJS materials by the
judge. See, e.g., United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554,568 (1989) ("disclosure of allegedly privileged
materials to the district court for purposes of determining the merits of a claim of privilege does not
have the legal effect of terminating the privilege."); United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 236-39
(1975); Federal Say. and Loan Ins. Corp. v. Ferm, 909 F.2d 372, 274 (9th Cir. 1990) ("In camera
review protects the attorney's private thoughts from 'intrusion by opposing parties and counsel' and
hence protects those interests which lie at the heart of the attorney work product doctrine.") (quoting
United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 236-39 (1975); -ickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 510-11
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Since no cases exist at this time which discuss the issue the
applicability of Batson to SJS, a litigant employing SJS should
consider disclosing the nature of the consultation to the judge
voluntarily. This would permit the judge to approve the peremptory
challenges, thereby preempting or reducing the chances for an
appeal based on Batson. Even if the SJS consultant has refrained
from using forbidden classifications, the widespread use of suspect
classifications in SJS makes the consultation suspect. Absent a
widespread disavowal of the use of these classifications within the
field, even the innocent SJS consultants remain suspect. On the
other side of the courtroom, litigants who suspect that their
opponent has employed an SJS consultant should object to the
opponent's first peremptory challenge. The litigant can then argue
that since SJS historically uses classifications forbidden under
Batson and its progeny, each peremptory challenge has an
unconstitutional element. A judge who agrees will then review the
SJS materials, thereby exposing the opponent to judicial scrutiny
and possible sanctions to remedy the use of forbidden
classifications.146 Even if the judge dismisses the objection
without inquiry, the issue is preserved for appeal.
2. SJS as a Paper Trail
If the SJS consultant has used race in a demographic survey,
then an attorney will find it difficult to avoid a Batson challenge.
Demographic surveys generate a complete, written documentation,
to which a judge can demand access. Like most social scientists,
SJS consultants enter the results of their surveys into statistical
computer packages. These packages allow social scientists to
summarize their data quickly and effectively, but they also create
paper trails which any court could follow easily. If aware of the
SJS techniques, a judge would demand an interpretation of

(1947)).
146. If the consultant has not used race, then the judicial review itself is the strongest remedy.
See infra notes 149-157 and accompanying text (outlining possible remedies for SJS's use of
race-based classifications).
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statistical printouts which would make it impossible to hide the use
of race in a demographic survey without committing outright
perjury. This paper trail eliminates one of the most troublesome
enforcement issues in Batson's command of race-neutrality.
Without SJS, litigants may refer to any characteristic of the venire
person to justify their challenge.147 With SJS, a judge has but to
examine the memoranda from the SJS consultant or to review the
statistical procedures to uncover the basis for the challenges.
An attorney could deny relying on the SJS consultant
exclusively. In fact, attorneys probably do not blindly follow an
SJS consultant's advice.148 The attorney could state that the
peremptory challenge is based on intuition or advice other than the
SJS consultant, but the trial judge remains free to disbelieve the
attorney. This situation leaves an attorney with the difficult task of
convincing a judge that she or he paid good money for an SJS
consultant, only to resort to intuition at the last minute. Even if the
judge accepts the attorney's disavowal, the SJS consultant's use of
race will result in some uncomfortable moments in the courtroom.
3. Remedying SJS's Use of Race
In Batson, the Supreme Court referred to two possible remedies
to a race-based peremptory challenge. The trial court could either
"discharge the venire and select a new jury from a panel not
previously associated with the case" or "disallow the discriminatory
challenge and resume selection with the improperly challenged
juror reinstated on the venire." 149 These two options are the most

147. Prosecutors sometimes face similar difficulties when trying to hide notes on their jury
selection plans. See, e.g., United States v. Nicholson, 885 F.2d 481, 482 (8th Cir. 1989).
148. In one famous documentation of SJS, the trial of Joan Little, the defense attorney reported
using several sources of advice in addition to an SJS demographic survey, including a psychic who
claimed to read the auras of the potential jurors. John B. McConahay et al., The Use of Social
Science in Trials With Politicaland Racial Overtones: The Trial of Joan Little. 41 L. & CoNTEMP.
PROBs., 205, 219 (1977).

149. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 100 n.24. Both of these remedies present difficulties for
the courts. See Alschuler, supra note 35, at 177-79. Selecting an entirely new jury is an expensive
solution. Reinstating the venire person essentially results in empaneling a juror who has now had an
adversarial experience with one of the litigants. The experience of being struck due to one's race and
then being reinstated may bias that juror against the litigant who struck him or her.
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common remedies to the improper use of a peremptory challenge,
but courts may devise other remedies as well.15 A trial court
could conceivably order the selection of a new panel and deny the
offending attorney the use of any further peremptory
challenges.' Any of these possible remedies results in the SJS
consultant burdening the client with additional time and expense.
At best, the attorney must defend each peremptory challenge
against a presumption that it was motivated by race.' 52 At worst,
the judge can restrict or eliminate the attorney's use of peremptory
challenges. 153
The current status of peremptory challenges poses difficulties
even for SJS consultants who eschew suspect classifications. Under
Batson and its progeny, a judge must inquire into the basis for a
peremptory challenge whenever a litigant makes a prima facie
demonstration that race inspired the challenge. 54 Given SJS's
reliance on race, the mere employment of an SJS consultant should
create a sufficient basis for a prima facie case and demand further
inquiry. Establishing a prima facie case requires the judge to
inquire further into the basis for the challenge. 5 5 Ordinarily, a
judge will simply ask the attorney to justify the challenge.' 56 If
collateral evidence exists, such as written notes, a judge may
demand to see it. 157 An attorney who has hired an SJS consultant
has inadvertently created an extensive paper trail for a judge to
follow. In preparing advice, SJS consultants create detailed data

analyses and summary memoranda which describe their predictions

150. Improper advice from an SJS consultant presents even greater difficulties for a court, since
the advice alters the entire pattern of strikes. Alschuler, supra note 35, at 177-79.
151. Peremptory challenges are "creatures of statute," not part ofproceedings mandated by due
process. Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, 88 (1988). A Maryland state court judge recently ordered
a that a new jury be selected after learning that one of the plaintiffs in a large asbestos case
erroneously sent a fax describing SJS strategies to one of the defendants. liz Spayd, Another Snag
Hits MarylandAsbestos Case: Misdirected Fax Prompts Manufacturers'Lawyer to Seek Mistrial,
WASH. PosT, May 31, 1991, at Dl.
152. As required in Batson, 476 U.S. at 96-97.

153.

See Alschuler, supra note 35, at 177-79.

154.
155.
156.
157.

See supra notes 83-88 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 87-789 and accompanying text.
See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., United States v. Nicholson, 885 F.2d 481, 482 (8th Cir. 1989).
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and conclusions. A judge may demand to see all of this material.
In fact, to the extent that Batson requires a diligent inquiry into the
basis for peremptory challenges, a judge may be obligated to
review such documentation. These materials may well demonstrate
that challenges have been exercised properly, and that the
consultation steered clear of racial classifications, but an attorney
might find such an inquiry uncomfortable. After Batson and
Edmonson, employment of any version of SJS invites judicial
scrutiny.
B. Arguments that Batson Challenges do not Apply to SJS
A peremptory challenge resulting from the advice of an SJS
consultant probably does not differ from conventional peremptory
challenges in most constitutionally significant respects. SJS does,
however, pose unique equal protection questions for courts. Social
scientists can make several arguments against the application of
Batson to their efforts to assist litigants in their jury selection.
These arguments and the responses thereto will be discussed in the
following sections.

1. SJS Employs Race only as a Surrogatefor Attitudes
As discussed, the Equal Protection Clause protects groups
formed by race, but not by attitudes. In fact, SJS depends on
finding attitudes which covary with race to predict juror's
responses to a case, not on the attitude of specific racial groups
towards the litigants. The social scientist who conducts a
community survey is not interested in the responses of various
protected groups to the defendant except inasmuch as the responses
identify individuals who hold certain attitudes or opinions which
that researcher believes would be harmful to the client's case. The
SJS consultant does not recommend striking black or white venire
persons out of fear that these groups are biased against the client's
case, but because they are more likely to hold specific attitudes.
The litigants who use SJS can articulate a race-neutral explanation
for the exercise of a peremptory challenge: They can assert that the
1529
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challenged venire person is likely to hold an attitude that favors
their opponent. The venire person's race merely marks the presence
or absence of the targeted attitude. At least one lower court case
supports this position. In United States v. Clemmons,158 the
prosecutor struck an Asian Indian venire person, giving as his
justification his belief that the juror was "probably a Hindu, and
Hindus have different feelings about these things. ' ' 159 Some
confusion about the actual race of the juror existed, and the appeals
court decided that, for the purposes of appeal, they had to consider
the venire person as a black person and apply Batson's analysis to
the prosecutor's explanation. " The court ruled that since the
prosecutor's motivations for the challenge did not arise from an
intent to discriminate against black venire persons, then the equal
protection clause was satisfied. 6 ' The court, in effect, permitted
the prosecutor to make an assumption based on the race of the
venire person, since the prosecutor inferred religious practice from
venire person's race. Although the confusion as to the race of the
venire person limits the value of the case as precedent, it permitted
the use of race as a proxy under the theory that Batson only forbids
discriminatory intent.
The argument used in Clemmons does not save SJS from equal
protection scrutiny. Litigants using SJS ultimately make their
challenges in part because the venire person is a certain race. A
case from the Tenth Circuit directly addresses this SJS technique.
In United States v. Brown,' 62 the prosecutor expressed concern
that the defense attorney was a prominent leader in the black
community and, as such, black jurors would have considerable
respect and affinity for him. 6 This prosecutor used the race of
the venire persons as his marker for this affinity." 6 He did not
strike black venire persons out of pure bigotry, but because of the

158.
159.
160.
161.
162.

892 F.2d 1153 (3d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 927 (1990).
l at 1156.
Id.
Id at 1157.
817 F.2d 674, 676 (10th Cir. 1987).

163. Id, at 675.
164. Id. at 675-76.
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currency the defense attorney might hold with them.1 65 As the
Tenth Circuit held, "[w]hile the [Batson] rule interdicts the exercise
of peremptory challenges for purely racial reasons, it does not
forbid challenges of minority jurors for legitimate reasons
tangentially connected with their race. But such a linkage cannot
be assumed just because of racial identity." 166 In Clark v. City of
Bridgeport,'67 an application of Batson to a civil rights case, a
government attorney used his peremptory challenges to eliminate
blacks on the grounds that the defendant had "poor rapport" with
blacks in the community. 68 The trial judge rejected this argument

as a failure to articulate a race neutral principle for using the
peremptory challenge. 69 Both Brown and Clark demonstrate that
Batson forbids the use of race as a marker or proxy for attitudes
which will affect the juror's disposition towards the case. Brown,
Clark and SJS present different versions of the same basic story-use of race as a marker. SJS differs from conventional jury
selection regarding the basis for predicting the biases which
correlate with race, but not in the implementation of these
predictions.
Furthermore, the author of Powers and Edmonson, Justice
Kennedy, asserts that the proper method for ferreting out biases and
prejudices of potential jurors is voir dire.17 Kennedy asserts that
a litigant may explore "biases and instincts in a rational way that
consists with respect for the dignity of persons, without the use of
classification based on ancestry and skin color."''
Also,
Edmonson holds that "[w]hether the race generality employed by
litigants to challenge a potential juror derives from open hostility
or from some hidden and unarticulated fear, neither entitles the

165.

Id at 675.

166. Id at 676.
167. 645 F. Supp. 890 (D. Conn. 1986).
168. letat 893.
169. Id at 894.
170. Edmonson, 111 S.CL at 2088. Kennedy explained: The quiet rationality of the courtroom
makes it an appropriate place to confront race-based fears or hostility by means other than the use
of offensive stereotypes." Id
171. Id
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'
litigant to cause injury to the excused juror."172
Thus, although
he addresses the more direct concern that peremptory challenges
not be used merely based on the belief that certain races will react
in specific ways to the litigants, Kennedy uses language which
would include the use of race as a proxy for any attitude relevant
to the litigation. 73
One other recent Supreme Court case involving a Batson
challenge, Hernandez v. New York,174 comes closest to addressing
the issue of race as a proxy. In Hernandez, the Court upheld a
prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges against bilingual, Latino
jurors.175 The Court argued that the prosecutor did more than
offer a bald assumption concerning Latino jurors or even of
bilingual jurors.176 The prosecutor apparently asked each bilingual
juror if they would be able to ignore their abilities and attend to a
translation of Spanish speaking witnesses rather than the actual
statements of the witnesses. 17 7 This prosecutor asserted that he
struck these jurors because of their hesitancy in answering his voir
dire inquiries.17' The Hernandez majority opinion observed that
the case would be different if the prosecutor's justification for the
peremptory challenges was that he did not want Spanish speaking
jurors.179 The prosecutor's efforts to strike the undesirable

characteristic without making assumptions saved the conviction.
To defend SJS, an advocate would have to assert that the harm
caused by employing a racial stereotype in jury selection can differ
depending upon the basis for the litigant's generalization. An SJS
advocate would argue that they do not demean venire persons
through the use of race because they know which jurors are likely

172. IML
173. This analysis ignores the possibility that jurors will be evasive during voir dire when
questioned about bias or prejudice. Although Justice Kennedy does not address this issue, perhaps
his reference to the "quiet rationality of the courtroom" means that litigants must rely on their own
cross examination skills, along with the threat of perjury, to obtain honest answers from the venire
persons.
174. 111 S. Ct. 1859 (1991).
175. Id. at 1867.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 1864-65.
178. Id at 1865.
179. Id at 1872.
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to hold favorable or unfavorable attitudes. The harm to the venire
person does not, however, depend upon the source of the
stereotype. The litigant using an SJS race based challenge has made
a generalization as to the attitudes and prejudices that a venire
person holds, merely on the basis of an individual's race.
Part of the concern with the race-based stereotypes in
Edmonson and Powers arises from the fact that a litigant can use
voir dire to search for the potential bias. When Justice Kennedy
recommends that the concern for prejudice be addressed in the
"quiet rationality of the courtroom," SJS should pay heed. If the
argument for SJS is that it serves as a proxy for an attitude, a court
could ask why the litigant does not use race simply to decide
whether to question the prospective jurors as to whether they hold
the attitude, rather than summarily excluding them via peremptory
challenge."'
2. SJS as a Race Neutral Process
The litigant using SJS can argue that SJS is inherently a race
neutral procedure. The litigant has no interest in eliminating jurors
of a specific race until research demonstrates that race predicts
attitudes relevant to the trial. The collection and analysis of survey
data is race-neutral. In SJS, a blind statistical process determines
the peremptory challenges. Unlike traditional jury selection, the
litigant using SJS has no prior conception of what attitudes and
biases are held by various races. SJS consultants approach the
litigation with an open mind and let the data determine which
venire persons to exclude. Traditional jury selection contains far
more room for racial stereotypes than does SJS.
As support for this argument, social scientists can rely on
Lockhart v. McCree."8 ' McCree contested the constitutionality of

180. Justice Kennedy ignores a restriction common to voir dire. For example, in Federal Court,
the trial judge generally conducts the voir dire, and does not allow attorneys to ask questions by
themselves. See Bermant & Shapard, supra note 20, at 81-87.
181. 476 U.S. 162 (1986).
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his death qualified jury,"8 2 in part, by arguing that the jurors
excluded in such a process are more likely to be minorities and
women."8 3 In upholding the death qualification process, the
majority stated that the disparate impact of death qualification had
no constitutional significance since it was an unintentional
consequence."8 4 Likewise, an advocate can characterize SJS as a
neutral process with some disparate effects.
Unlike the judge who death qualifies a jury, an SJS consultant
decides to use race deliberately. If used in a large number of cases,
SJS might be thought of as merely having a disparate impact, but
in a single case, its effect is deliberately disproportionate. The
empirical aspect of SJS makes such a practice even more suspect,
since the demographer spends time and effort creating a racial
generalization. SJS consultants use race in demographic profiles in
the hope of finding some characteristic which will covary with an
attitude, thereby making it a reliable predictor of verdict choice.
That this practice visits harm on races at random or that each race
is equally likely to suffer under it can be no defense."' An
appropriate analogy to this situation would be if a school district
decided to offer two types of reading classes, one advanced and
one normal. In deciding which students belong in which class, the
district decides that the classes must be racially homogenous and
as a result, decides to offer the advanced class to students of
whichever race scores highest on a reading test. Any court applying
equal protection scrutiny would find either SJS or the hypothetical
school test equally objectionable.

182. Capital trials are traditionally bifurcated; a jury first determines the guilt or innocence of
the defendant in one proceeding, and then a secondjury decides whether to apply the death penalty.
In many states, the same jury decides both guilt and sentence. Since some jurors state that their
opposition to capital punishment prevents them from ever considering the death penalty, they are
excluded from both parts of the proceeding in these states. The process of eliminating these jurors
is called "death qualifying" a jury. Id at 162-63.
183.
d at 173-76.
184. Id
185. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (even though statute prohibiting interracial marriage statute visits equal harm on both black and white citizens, it still violates the Equal
Protection Clause).
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3. SJS Creates Empirically Valid Race Based Peremptory
Challenges
Proponents of SJS could argue that unlike the invidious
stereotypes of prosecutors and trial attorneys, they have an
empirical basis for peremptory challenges. Under this argument,
SJS could pass strict judicial scrutiny, since its methods guarantee
that some correlation will exist between the presence of an attitude
and the race of the juror. In City of Bridgeport, the trial judge
responded to the government attorney's assertion that black jurors
would favor the plaintiff by asking the attorney if he had any
"empirical data" to support his position.186 In his opinion in the
case, the trial judge seemed to condemn the attorney for his use of
"instinct," but gives no clear indication whether empirical data
87
could have saved the attorney's peremptory challenges.'
Under the strict scrutiny of the Equal Protection Clause, no
amount of empirical data can justify a race-based classification
unless it clearly demonstrates that all of the members of one race
share an attitude which all persons of other races do not hold.'88
By nature, the findings of SJS are only statistical generalizations.
SJS searches for tendencies and averages, making many errors of
classification. No stereotype or generalization based on SJS could
survive the strict scrutiny that the courts traditionally apply to
race-based classifications. Consider for example, Craig v.
Boren,189 in which the Court struck down an Oklahoma statute
permitting women under the age of twenty-one to purchase beer
but not men. 9 In support of the statute, Oklahoma presented
evidence that males between the ages of eighteen and twenty-one

186. Clark v. City of Bridgeport, 645 F. Supp. 890, 893-94 (D. Conn 1986).
187. Id at 894.
188. The heightened scrutiny which the Court demands of race-based classifications requires
that the classification fit its statutory goal more closely than any of its possible alternatives. See, e.g.,
McLaughlin et al. v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 196 (1964) (racial classifications bear "a heavy burden
of justification [and] will be upheld only if [necessary] and not merely rationally related to the

accomplishment of a permissible state policy.") For a discussion of the "goodness of fit" issue in
heightened scrutiny, see JoHN HART ELY, DEmOCRACY AND DIsTRuST 146-49 (1980).
189. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
190. Id at 210.
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were ten times more likely to be arrested for drunk driving than
females of the same age. 9 ' If such statistical disparity could not
satisfy the heightened scrutiny of gender based claims, then they
could not satisfy the strict scrutiny of racial classifications. As
applied to SJS, the statistics in Craig represent a much better fit
between the classification and the state interest than do most of the
SJS data from demographic correlation of the attitudes used in jury
selection."9
Furthermore, the demographic surveys are extremely unlikely
to have much persuasive effect on a court, especially the Supreme
Court. Considering the treatment that social science methodologies
have received in past cases involving intelligence tests, 193 jury
simulations, 9 4 and jury representativeness, 195 an SJS consultant
can scarcely hope to convince a court that it should permit a
race-based classification as a result of survey data.
4. In SJS, Race is Only One Component of a Demographic
Survey
SJS could defend its methods by joining the ranks of the
prosecutors who have successfully weathered Batson challenges by

admitting that they considered race, but pointing to a number of
characteristics other than race to support their challenges.' 96 This
potential loophole in the Batson prohibition arises from ambiguity

191. Id. at 200-201. Less than .2% of females between 18 and 21 were arrested versus 2% of
males. Id
192. In Craig,more than ninety percent of those arrested for drunk driving in Oklahoma were
male. By contrast, one of the most extensive mock trial studies conducted at Harvard by Reid Hastie
and his colleagues correctly predicted less than fifty percent of the verdicts using all of their
demographic predictors. RnD HAsTm Er AL., INSIDE THE JuRY 129 (1983).
193. See P.A.S. v. Hannon, 506 F. Supp. 831 (N.D. IM1.
1980) and criticisms of this case by
Donald N. Bersoff, Testing and the Law, 36 AM. PsYCHoL. 1047 (1981).
194. See Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 168-73 (1986) (providing Rehnquist's discussion
of the death qualification studies). But see Phoebe C. Ellsworth, To Tell What We Know Or Wait For
Godot?, 15 L. & HUM. BEHAv. 77 (1991) (criticizing Rehnquist's analysis).
195. See Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223,246 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring) (Justice Powell
refers to social science methods and statistics as 'numerology"). See also Donald N. Bersoff,
Psychologistsand the JudicialSystem: BroaderPerspectives,IOL. &HUM. BEHAv. 151,166 (1986)
(discussing jury representativeness issues).
196. See, e.g., Alschuler, supra note 35, at 173-76.
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in the Court's prior decisions. In Batson, the Court demanded a
race-neutral explanation for the prosecutor's peremptory challenge,
but it did not clarify whether a "mixed motive" is acceptable.197
The question left open is whether Batson prohibits peremptory
challenges based solely on the race of the venire person or whether
it prohibits race from entering into the decision to challenge a juror
at all. If Batson only prohibits challenges based entirely on race,
then most SJS challenges should survive scrutiny under Batson.'98
SJS is invariably a multidimensional process in which researchers
assess several characteristics of the venire person to assess their
desirability as a juror. The recommendations of SJS consultants
almost never turn exclusively on a single characteristic.
Courts have had some difficulty untangling the permissible
from impermissible motivations of the litigants.'99 Some courts
have held that if race made the difference between striking a venire
person and not striking, then Batson's probation has been violated.
For example, in Garrett v. Morris,2" a prosecutor claimed to
have struck black venire persons because they "lacked education."
The Appeals Court rejected this explanation since the prosecutor
had neglected to strike two white venire persons who had only high
school educations, while two of the black venire persons struck had
college credit. 2°1 Other courts have adopted a more lenient
02 a
standard for Batson. In United States v. Terrazas-Carrasco,
court upheld the prosecutor's peremptory challenges, even though
they may have resulted from both permissible and impermissible
motives." 3 This court determined that under Batson, a
peremptory challenge violates equal protection when exercised
"solely on account" of race.2°

197. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 97 (1986).
198. See supra notes 14-32 and accompanying text (discussing SJS procedures).
199. See, e.g., United States v. Alcantar, 897 F.2d 436,438 (9th Cir. 1990) (remanding to the
district court, demanding a fairly elaborate hearing as to whether a race neutral explanation offered
by a prosecutor was prejudicial).
200. 815 F.2d 509, 510 (8th Cir. 1987).
201. Id. at 514.
202. 861 F.2d 93 (5th Cir. 1988).
203. Itd at 94-95.
204. I. at 94.
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Under the similar characteristics test, an SJS demographic study
that includes race could not survive a Batson challenge. If an SJS
consultant found that members of a certain race were more likely
to hold a certain attitude, and factored this into a formula weighting
the desirability of that juror, then an attorney would treat two
venire persons who share all of the researched characteristics
except race differently. Depending upon the size of the correlation
between the race and the attitude relative to others, permissible
correlations, the venire person's race might not mean the difference
between using a peremptory and not using one. Race will still
partly determine the desirability of the juror. The presence of a race
variable in SJS makes the process suspect.
The clearest case available on mixed motives suggests that
courts will tolerate a racial motivation if other considerations
outweighed it. In United States v. Thompson,0 5 the prosecutor
justified a strike by explaining that the venire person "lived in the
[defendant's] neighborhood, he's black too, and I thought he would
identify with him too much."2 6 The court identified the
prosecutor as providing exactly the kind of explanation forbidden
by Batson, but found that the prosecutor had also given a
permissible explanation regarding jurors living in the same
neighborhood as the defendant. 7 Unable to determine whether
the challenge would have been made had the neighbor been white,
the court remanded for a determination as to whether the
impermissible explanation had mitigated the challenge. 208 As
applied to SJS, if the inclusion makes the difference between using
a challenge and not using a challenge, it violates the equal
protection rights of venire persons. Thus, the inclusion of a
forbidden classification in an SJS survey might not cause
difficulties for attorney's peremptory challenges if the race variable
never alters the challenges. With this "makes a difference"
corollary of the similar characteristics test, an SJS consultant still

205.
206.
207.
208.
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ought to avoid collecting or analyzing data using a forbidden
classification because it is precisely those circumstances in which
the race or gender of the venire person matters that it would
become unconstitutional to use them. In the best case, the
forbidden classification fails to make a strong or useful prediction.
In light of the Court's holdings, however, an SJS consultant can
only waste time and money analyzing forbidden classifications.
From Justice Kennedy's reasoning in Edmonson, it can be
deduced that the use of forbidden classifications in an SJS
demographic survey would taint the entire peremptory process for
the SJS consultant's client. In determining that the use of
peremptory challenges constitutes state action, Justice Kennedy
relied on the similarity between jury selection procedures and state
employment processes."M Kennedy cited cases which hold that
when a private party makes employment decisions for the state,
equal protection constraints bind that party's decisions.21°
Applying this analogy to SJS, an SJS consultant effectively uses
race as an item on a state employment test by including a racial
characteristic in a demographic profile. Such a practice would
certainly lead to Court action to prohibit reliance on the test,
regardless of whether it made a difference to the employment
decision for a plaintiff.21 '
To sum up, although SJS differs from conventional jury
selection to the extent that a court would have to analyze the
Batson challenge differently, these differences do not free SJS from
the scope of equal protection. An SJS consultant using forbidden
classifications risks violating the Court's command that litigants
exercise peremptory challenges without regard to the race of the
potential jurors.

209. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete, Co., 111 S. Ct. 2077, 2085-87 (1991).
210. l at 2085.
211. See, e.g., Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 272,274 (1986) (plurality opinion)
(state may not give preferential treatment in layoffs on basis of race without a compelling state
interest); Colorado Anti-Discrimination Comm'n v. Continental Airlines, Inc., 372 U.S. 714, 721
(1963) ("any state... law requiring applicants to be turned away because of their color would be

invalid under the... Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment").
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V. UNRESOLVED ISSUES

The extent to which the Batson cases threaten the enterprise of
SJS depends, in part, upon how many classifications are forbidden.
As originally stated, Batson banned the deliberate exercise of
challenges against members of cognizable classes. 212 In restating
the Batson holding in Edmonson and Powers, the current Court has
prohibited the exercise of a peremptory challenge against anyone
on the basis of their race.213 Batson and its progeny now protects
white venire persons as well as minorities from being excluded
from service on the basis of their race.214 To date, the Supreme
Court has condemned only racial classifications in peremptory
challenges, but lower federal courts and some state courts have
forbidden classifications based on gender, ethnicity, and religion as
well.215 Since Batson and its progeny rely on the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the holdings are probably
limited to classifications that require heightened scrutiny, such as
race or gender. This leaves attorneys and SJS consultants free to
use variables such as age, education, and marital status in
determining which venire persons to strike. However, the
Fourteenth Amendment is not the only constitutional provision
which requires courts to take a careful look at the justification for
treating individuals differently.2" 6 For example, the First
Amendment's protection of freedom of association could logically
prevent a litigant from striking venire persons because of their
membership in a political organization. Thus far, equal protection

212.

Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 97 (1986).

213.

See supra notes 98-136 and accompanying text (analyzing Batson in light of Edmonson

and Powers).
214. See id (discussing the impact of Batson and its progeny on standing issues).
215. See, e.g., United States v. Greer, 939 F.2d 1076, 1086 (5th Cir. 1991) (may not strike
venire persons because of "race, religion or national origin"); United States v. DeGross, 913 F.2d
1417, 1426 (9th Cir. 1990) (prosecutor may not strike venire persons because of their gender);
Commonwealth v. Soares, 387 N.E.2d 499, 516 (Mass. 1979) (Massachusetts Constitution forbids
use of peremptories against venire persons because of their membership in groups defined by "sex,

race, color, creed and national origin").
216. See infra notes 321-341 and accompanying text.
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is the only basis for attacking peremptory challenges, but Batson
provides the foundation for further assaults.
Batson and its recent progeny have added a new source of
contention in the litigation process. The extent of satellite litigation
created by these cases is as yet unknown, but it may be
extensive. 217 While Batson's effect in terms of extending or
delaying litigation is unknown, it could be substantial.218
Edmonson, Powers, and McCollum fail to answer some of the
issues Batson left unresolved since they do not create clear a limit
to Batson's scope. Several questions remain unanswered, including
the types of litigants who have standing to raise Batson claims and
which venire persons require Fourteenth Amendment protection
from exclusion by peremptory challenge. This section will discuss
these open questions and their potential impact on SJS.
A. Synthesis of Powers and Edmonson
Like Batson, Edmonson was a black litigant asserting third
party standing on behalf of black venire persons. One could argue
that like Batson, Edmonson only applies when a member of a
cognizable racial minority faces an opponent who strikes members
of the same minority. Although Powers overruled this limitation on
standing to raise Batson claims, Powers was a criminal defendant
who attacked the peremptory challenges of a prosecutor, not a civil
litigant who objected to the challenges exercised by an
opponent.219 Taken together, however, Powers and Batson
suggest no limitation on who may raise a Batson objection. Notably

217. LEXIS and Shepard's searches reveal hundreds of published appeals based on Batson.
These appeals fall generally into two classifications: Those cases in which the defendant argues that
the trial judge erred in deciding that he had not made a prima facie case, and those in which the
defendant contends that the prosecutor's race-neutral explanation was invalid. A brief survey of the
case law reveals that these issues are far from settled. See Alsehuler, supra note 35, at 170-76; Mintz,
supra note 35, at 1034-38.
218. See, e.g., Pizzi, supra note 35, at 138-44 (arguing that Batson adds too much to the cost
of conducting a trial); see also Justice Scalia's discussion in Edmonson, Ill S. Ct. at 2095-96 (1991)
(Sealia, J., dissenting).
219. See supra notes 72-106 and accompanying text (discussing the Powers and Batson
decisions).
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absent from the Edmonson majority's list of requirements for
making out a prima facie case of discriminatory intent is any
reference to the race of the parties.22 Even though the Edmonson
court reviewed the case of a black plaintiff raising the
constitutional claims of black venire persons, the Edmonson
majority refused to withhold standing from a litigant of any
race.221 This holding stands as a stark contrast to the Batson
decision. Taken together with the Edmonson majority's heavy
reliance on Powers, it would seem that anyone may raise the
Fourteenth Amendment claims of challenged jurors in civil or
criminal cases.
Furthermore, in a related case, Hernandez v. New York,222
Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, rewrote Batson's
standing requirements to comport with Powers.223 In Hernandez,
a Latino defendant objected to a prosecutor's admitted use of
peremptory challenges to exclude jurors fluent in both English and
Spanish.224 As a prerequisite to evaluating the constitutionality of
the impact that such use of peremptory challenges would have on
the presence of Latino jurors, the Court first had to conclude that
Latino venire persons fell within the protections offered by
Batson."5 A number of lower courts had already concluded that
Batson applies to Latinos,2 26 and the majority had little problem
with such holdings, noting that defendants can raise a Batson claim
if they can show that the prosecutor has exercised peremptory
challenges on the basis of race, as a prima facie matter.227
Although Kennedy cited Batson for this proposition, he did not cite
Batson's exact language. While Kennedy demanded that a
defendant demonstrate that race played a role in the challenge,

220.

Edmonson, 111 S. Ct. at 2088-89.

221.

Id. at 2087-88.

222.

111 S. Ct. 1859 (1991).

223. Id at 1865-66.
224. Id at 1864-65.
225. Id at 1866.
226. See, e.g., United States v. De La Rosa, 911 F.2d 985, 990-91 (5th Cir. 1990); United
States v. Rudas, 905 F.2d 38, 41 (2d Cir. 1990); United States v. Alvarado, 891 F.2d 439, 443 (2d
Cir. 1989).

227.
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Batson required that "[t]he defendant must demonstrate that he is
a member of a cognizable group, and that the prosecutor has
exercised peremptory challenges to remove from the venire
members of the defendant's race."228 The majority's novel
language rewrote Batson, removing the implication that Batson
only forbade a prosecutor from eliminating racial minorities. The
Court views the specter of racial assumptions in peremptory
challenges as an evil unto itself, suffered by the community and the
affected venire persons." Batson addressed only the unfairness
of trying a minority by a jury deliberately chosen to exclude
members of his race. Where Batson's limitations arise from a
mingling of the rights of the defendant and the venire person,
Kennedy makes a clean break. In his opinions in Hernandez,
Powell, and Edmonson, he defends the fights of the venire persons
against exclusion from service on the basis of invidious
stereotypes.230
B. Beyond Racial Minorities
Many lower courts have heard equal protection objections to
peremptory challenges based on gender,231 ethnicity232 and
attitudes.233 The courts are currently divided on these issues and
the Supreme Court has left them unanswered. Courts have also
used expansions of Batson to cover challenges to white venire
persons. 23' As discussed in this section, these issues remain
clouded, since the Supreme Court has yet to address them, and

228.

Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96 (1986).

229. See supra notes 104-106 and accompanying text.
230. See supra notes 98-130, 174-179 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Kennedy's
attitudes regarding the use of stereotypes in the peremptory challenge process).
231.

United States v. DeGross, 913 F.2d 1417, 1419 (9th Cir. 1990); United States v. Wilson,

867 F.2d 486, 488 (8th Cir. 1989); United States v. Hamilton, 850 F.2d 1038, 1040 (4th Cir. 1988);
United States v. Dennis, 804 F.2d 1208, 1210 (1lth Cir. 1986).
232. Murchu v. United States, 926 F.2d 50, 52 (Ist Cir. 1991); United States v. DiPasquale,
864 F.2d 271,275-77 (3d Cir. 1988); United States v. Anguilo, 847 F.2d 956,984-85 (lst Cir. 1988);
United States v. Bucci, 839 F.2d 825, 832-33 (1st Cir. 1988).
233. United States v. Salamone, 800 F.2d 1216, 1219-20 (3d Cir. 1986).
234. Roman v. Abrams, 822 F.2d 214, 226-27 (2d Cir. 1987).
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lower courts are somewhat divided.235 While Batson applies
explicitly to racial minorities, how far Batson extends beyond
race-based challenges remains uncertain. As applied to SJS, the
limits that Batson places on SJS depend entirely upon its scope.
Before 1991, Batson applied only to prosecutors and their
challenges against members of cognizable classes, and as a result,
had only limited application to SJS. If Batson and its extensions
forbid all use of race in peremptory challenges by any litigant, then
SJS must adjust to avoid the use of race. If Batson extends to
gender as well as race, then SJS is further disrupted. The more
categories which are forbidden, the more difficult it will be for SJS
to stay within constitutional boundaries.
1. Challenges to White Venire Persons Based on Race
In at least one case, a lower court has overturned the conviction
of a defendant because a prosecutor used peremptory challenges in
a deliberate attempt to eliminate white venire persons. In Roman v.
Abrams,23 6 the Second Circuit reviewed the case of a white
defendant's conviction by a jury which resulted from a prosecutor's
attempts to exclude white venire persons.2 37 In overturning the
conviction, the Second Circuit condemned the "wholesale
exclusion" of white jurors practiced by the prosecution.238 The
court observed that although such exclusion normally occurs only
against traditionally disadvantaged groups, excluding traditionally
majority groups is also objectionable because such an exclusion
arbitrarily "deprives that group of a share of the responsibility for
the administration of justice, deprives the defendant of the
possibility that his petit jury will reflect a fair cross section of the
'
community and gives every appearance of unfairness."239
The
Supreme Court's expanded standing to raise a Batson claim
encompasses peremptory challenges based on any race, minority or
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
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822 F.2d 214 (2d Cir. 1987).
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otherwise. As discussed previously, Hernandez and Powers rewrite
Batson to cover challenges based on race rather than on
membership in a cognizable class. Thus, Batson has become more
than a protection for minority defendants.
The Court now demands that litigants exercise peremptory
challenges in a race-neutral fashion, regardless of previous histories
of discrimination of racial groups.240 This requirement comports
with the current Court's ambivalence towards affirmative action
programs.241 The Court now applies its highest level of equal
protection scrutiny to racial classifications, without exception for
remedial statutes and practices which favor minorities.242 In a
recent case, City of Richmond v. J. A. Crosen Co.,243 a majority
of the Court struck down an affirmative action plan devised by the
City of Richmond, Virginia. 2" In doing so, the Court declared
that the Fourteenth Amendment permits governmental entities to
engage in affirmative action only after a specific finding that a
history of racial disadvantage and discrimination exists.245
Furthermore, the state must narrowly tailor the remedial action to
redress that specific history.2 46
Under these standards, peremptory challenges against white
venire persons cannot fit into the narrow exception the Court has
carved out for remedial action. Peremptory challenges against white
venire persons on the basis of their race do not redress a history of

discrimination against minorities: Litigants challenge venire persons
on the basis of race because they believe that it will give them an
advantage. Thus, both the language and the theory driving the
Court's recent equal protection analysis in both peremptory
challenges and other issues dictate that courts entertain objections
to peremptory challenges based on any racial stereotype. Given the

240. See supranotes 98-136 and accompanying text (discussing the present status of race-based
peremptory challenge law).
241. See, e.g., Joint Statement, ConstitutionalScholar's Statement on Affirmative Action After
City of Richmond v. J.A. Crosen Co., 98 YALE LJ. 1711 (1989).
242. Id. at 1712-13.
243. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
244. Id. at 511.
245. let at 498-506.
246. Id.
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Crosen holding, it should come as no surprise that the Court has
altered Batson's language. If the Equal Protection Clause protects
both minority and non-minority groups alike, then neither black nor
white venire persons may suffer exclusion from jury service as a
consequence of their race.
2. ChallengesBased on Ethnicity
The Court has not heard any cases concerning challenges based
on the ethnic background of the venire person. In other contexts,
however, Justice Rehnquist has observed that in the United States,
ethnicity is the "close cousin" of race and should be considered for
Fourteenth Amendment's heightened scrutiny.247 Like race,
ethnicity is an immutable characteristic that invites stereotyping and
invidious generalizations.248 For decades, famous litigators have
advised attorneys as to those ethnic groups which might favor types
of cases.249 Social scientists have followed suit, using ethnic
characteristics as part of their SJS work.250 If Batson applies to

ethnicity in the same manner as race, then the use of ethnicity by
SJS is equally forbidden.
Although peremptory challenges based on ethnicity are rarely
challenged and rarely succeed, at least two circuits have accepted
the application of Batson to ethnic groups. In United States v.
Biaggi,5'1 the Second Circuit agreed that the defendant had made

247. Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762,777 (1977) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting). In fact, some of
the earliest cases applying heightened scrutiny to statutes involving racial classifications actually
concern national origin more so than race. See, e.g., Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886)
(scrutiny of a statute discriminating against Chinese-Americans); Korematsu v. United States, 323
U.S. 214 (1944) (scrutiny of internment of Japanese-Americans during World War II).
248. For a discussion of the relevance of immutable characteristics to equal protection analysis,
see JoHN H. ELY, DEMocRAcY & DISTRUST 150-60 (1980).
249. See, e.g., Clarence Darrow, Attorney for the Defense, EsQURE, May 1936, at 36-37,
211-213 (Darrow wans against having persons of Scotch and Scandinavian descent on a jury,
because they allegedly tend to adopt a cold, punitive stance); F. LEE BAILEY & HENRY B.
ROTHBLATr, SUCCESSFUL TECHNIQUES FOR CitMiNAL TRIALS, 84-85 (1971) (instructing the reader
to use jurors of Southern European descent because of their emotional zeal).
250. See, e.g., Zeisel & Diamond, supra note 23, at 166-67 (describing one characteristic of
the ideal juror in the Mitchell-Stans Watergate conspiracy trial as someone who does not have Jewish
ancestry).

251.
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out a prima facie claim of racial discrimination against a prosecutor
who had eliminated jurors of Italian descent. 2 The court,
however, dismissed the defendant's claims by accepting the
prosecution's ethnic neutral explanation. 253 Other 'courts have
been more reluctant to apply Batson to ethnic groups. Courts in the
First Circuit have held that although in principle, Batson forbids
strikes on the basis of ethnicity, groups such as Irish-Americans are
not protected since they are not a cognizable class. 2" 4 Similarly,
other courts have held that Italian-Americans are not a cognizable
class for the purposes of jury service. 5 All three cases rely on
the language in Batson that proscribes equal protection attacks on
peremptory challenges to members of cognizable classes. 6 All
of these courts agreed that these two groups did not fit the
definition of cognizable class. In particular, these groups are not set
apart by others and treated differently under the law as practiced
or applied. 7
As discussed, the Court has eliminated the limitation that
supports these decisions."5 Standing to raise a Batson claim no
longer depends upon membership in a cognizable group. 5
Standing may rely instead on the Court's analysis of the harm to
the community and to the group which results from their arbitrary
elimination from jury service.26 Some of the ethnicity cases
encompass identical elements of the race cases. For example,
Murchu v. United States2 61 involved the prosecution of an
individual accused of smuggling arms to the Irish Republican
252.
253.
254.
926 F.2d

IX. at 678-79.
Id. at 679.
United States v. Sgro, 816 F.2d 30, 33 (1st Cir. 1987); see also Murchu v. United States,
50, 55 (1st Cir. 1991).

255.

United States v. Angiulo, 847 F.2d 956, 984-85 (Ist Cir. 1988); United States v. Bucci,

839 F.2d 825, 832-33 (1st Cir. 1988); United States v. DiPasquale, 864 F.2d 271, 275-77 (3d Cir.
1988).
256. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96 (1986).
257. Bucci, 839 F.2d at 833. The ethnicity cases also present problems of identification. In both
Bucci and Sgro, the prosecutor had eliminated jurors whose surnames matched ethnic classifications
without actually bothering to question the prospective jurors as to their ethnic background.
258. See supra notes 98-136 and accompanying text (discussing limitations on standing).
259. Powers v. Ohio, 111 S. Ct. 1364, 1368 (1991).
260. As discussed in Powers, 111 S. Ct. at 1368.
261. 926 F.2d 50 (1st Cir. 1991).
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Army. The defendant accused the prosecution of eliminating all of
the jurors with Irish surnames.262 Like the case of a state's
attorney eliminating black jurors in a civil rights case, this strategy
creates the appearance of unfairness. It denies service to those
individuals who represent a constituency with a clear interest in the
outcome of the case. Similarly, in United States v. DiPasqualeand
United States v. Bucci, the defendants were charged with mafia
related crimes.26 3 Under a scheme which demands a showing that
such exclusion harms the excluded individual and society,
DiPasquale, Bucci and Murchu have compelling claims. These
defendants clearly wanted members of their own ethnic group on
the jury for reasons which resemble the claims of black and Latino
defendants. In both types of cases, the exclusion harms the
appearance of justice and the group loses their ability to represent
themselves in a small, but important component of the criminal
justice process. In these cases, a litigant's stereotype deprives the
excluded jurors of their opportunity to serve. Although IrishAmericans and Italian-Americans may lack a history of systematic
exclusion from jury service that would make them "cognizable
groups," the Court has lifted this limitation. Because the Court no
longer limits Batson to groups with a history of discrimination,
challenges based on ethnicity must also violate the Fourteenth
Amendment.
3. Challenges Based on Gender
The Court has yet to address the application of Batson to
classifications other than race. In his dissent in Edmonson, Justice
Scalia criticizes the majority for burdening the courts by forcing
them to "[a]ssure that race is not included among the other factors
(sex, age, religion, political views, economic status) used by private

262.

Three jurors with such surnames were eliminated for cause; the defense objected to the

prosecution's elimination of jurors named 'Reardon," "Curran," "Connolly," and "Kirk." ld at 53.
263. United States v. DiPasquale, 864 F.2d 271,274 (3d. Cir. 1988) (charging defendants with
extortion); United States v. Bucci, 839 F.2d 825, 826-27 (1st Cir. 1988) (charging defendants with
drug trafficking).
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parties in exercising their peremptory challenges., 264 The
statement assumes that the Fourteenth Amendment permits the use
of gender and other characteristics as a basis for peremptory
challenges. At least with regards to the sex of venire persons, some
lower courts disagree.
Although jury representativeness issues arise most frequently
from disparities among racial groups, other classifications can also
result in constitutional challenges. The Court has struck down
26 5
Latinos, 26
venire systems which underinclude blacks,
women,267 and even blue collar employees.268 The impressive
pedigree of case law dealing with representative venire panels does
not translate directly into a requirement that peremptory challenges
269
preserve the representativeness of the venire. Swain v. Alabama
precludes this interpretation of the venire cases. Swain effectively
eliminated Sixth Amendment attacks on peremptory challenges. 70
Therefore, any objection to the exercise of peremptory challenges
against a class of persons must rest on the equal protection
jurisprudence associated with that classification.
To demand a gender-neutral explanation for peremptory
challenges, a litigant would have to assert the equal protection
claims of the jurors excluded on the basis of gender. Lower courts
have split on whether the Fourteenth Amendment protects venire
persons from peremptory challenges based on gender. A number of
courts accept gender-based explanations as satisfying the
prosecutor's burden of presenting a race-neutral motivation for a
peremptory challenge without even discussing the issue. For
example, in United States v. Wilson,27 the prosecutor explained

that he had used two of his challenges against black females in an
effort to increase the number of males on the jury.27 The Eighth

264. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 111 S. Ct. 2077,2096 (1991) (Scalla, J., dissenting).
265. See, e.g., Carter v. Jury Conm'n of Green County, 396 U.S. 320 (1970).
266. Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 495 (1977).
267. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 537 (1975).
268. Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217 (1946).
269. 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
270. Md.at 206.
271. 867 F.2d 486 (8th Cir. 1989).

272.

Id at 488.
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Circuit accepted this as the kind of clear, specific, race-neutral
reason which satisfies Batson without any discussion of the
constitutionality of deliberately excluding women.273 Three
subsequent cases in the Eighth Circuit followed this precedent.274
These courts neither discuss nor review the constitutionality of
gender based peremptory challenges.
At least one court has ruled explicitly that Batson does not
275
apply to gender-based challenges. In United States v. Hamilton,
the court declared that gender-based peremptory challenges do not
offend the equal protection rights of female venire persons. 276 In
Hamilton, the prosecutor struck three black, female jurors.277
When the court demanded an explanation, he asserted that female
jurors would sympathize with the female defendants in the
case.2 78 The court declared that even though females could not be
deliberately excluded from jury venires, the issues presented by
peremptory challenges differ.279 To support its position, the court
relied on the specific language in Batson which refers to the race
of the defendant and venire persons. Thus, the Hamilton court
concluded that although heightened scrutiny does apply to
gender-based discrimination, the language in Batson limits its
application to racial issues.28 °
The Ninth Circuit has taken a view contrary to the Fourth. In
United States v. DeGross,28' a male defendant protested a
prosecutor's pattern of striking only male venire persons. The
district court judge refused to require that the prosecutor provide

273.

d.

274. United States v. Hoelscher, 914 F.2d 1527, 1540-41 (8th Cir. 1990); United States v.
Nicholson, 885 F.2d 481, 482-83 (8th Cir 1989); United States v. Ross, 872 F.2d 249, 249-50 (8th
Cir. 1989).
275. 850 F.2d 1038 (4th Cir. 1988).
276. Id at 1042-43.
277. Id at 1041.
278. Id
279. Id at 1042-43.
280. See also United States v. Dennis, 804 F.2d 1208, 1210 (1 Ith Cir. 1986) (holding that
although the test for "cognizable class" in Batson refers to the Castaneda case, this means that
blacks, and not black males specifically are a cognizable class, and therefore peremptory challenges
against black males because they were male do not raise the Batson issue).
281. 913 F.2d 1417 (9th Cir. 1990).
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a gender-neutral explanation for the challenges.282 On appeal, the
Ninth Circuit reversed. The DeGross court began its analysis with
the same observation made by the Fourth Circuit--Batsonexplicitly
applies only to race-based challenges.283 It went beyond this
observation, however, and held that like race, gender-based
practices merit a higher level of scrutiny for Fourteenth
Amendment analysis.284 This heightened scrutiny required the
court to review the nature of the governmental interest and the
relationship of its practice of striking female venire persons to that
interest.28 The court noted that the peremptory challenges are
part of a scheme to create an impartial jury.286 Gender-based
challenges result from assumptions about the different proclivities
of male and female jurors. Like racial classifications, these
assumptions lack any clear foundation.287 Furthermore, gender
may not serve as a proxy for a hidden prejudice, since voir dire
provides a means of uncovering bias.288 The court thus concluded
that gender-based assumptions do not further the state's interest in
a neutral jury because they are usually unfounded and always
imperfect. 289 The court observed that gender is "simply unrelated
to [one's] ability to serve as a juror."2 The DeGross court also
expressed concern that jury selection strategies which discriminate
against various groups in the community might erode public
confidence in the jury system.2 9 It declared that a jury is not
truly representative unless both sexes have an equal opportunity to
serve.

29 2

Although DeGross relies in part on the harm to the community
which results from gender discrimination in the courtroom, the

282.
283.
284.
285.
286.
287.
288.
289.
290.
291.

Id. at 1420.
Id. at 1421.
IdMat 1422.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id

292.

Id at 1423.
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decision turns on the heightened scrutiny applied to gender-based
classifications. The opinion reviews the relationship between the
state's interest in an impartial jury and the practice of eliminating
jurors on the basis of their gender.293 The court concluded that,
in general, peremptory challenges further the state's interest in
creating an impartial jury.294 Ordinarily, a litigant may act on
assumptions concerning the prejudices of venire persons, and the
litigant can defend such a practice as having a rational relationship
to its interest in an impartial jury. When the assumption arises from
a classification which demands scrutiny higher than rational basis,
however, the peremptory challenge that results cannot survive
constitutional review. The heightened scrutiny robs the challenge
of its purpose.
Despite the widespread acceptance of gender-based peremptory
challenges, and the apparent split between the circuits, DeGross is
a well reasoned opinion. The Fourteenth Amendment challenges to
gender discrimination have a mixed history, 9 5 but the Supreme
Court has applied heightened scrutiny to gender discrimination in
jury selection. In a pair of cases, the Court struck down jury
296
selection statutes which treated males and females differently.
In each case, the Court relied on the Sixth Amendment rights of a
criminal defendant, but used language which indicates that gender
discrimination in jury selection must pass heightened scrutiny.2 97
In Taylor v. Louisiana, the State defended its denial of jury service
to women on the grounds that so many women would be excused
to tend to their children that administrative convenience permitted
Louisiana to grant a blanket exemption to all women. 298 Although
it acknowledged that the statute mighf pass rational basis scrutiny,

293.
294.
295.

Id. at 1422.
Id. at 1423.
See, e.g., Ann E. Freedman, Sex Equality, Sex Differences, and the Supreme Court, 92

YALE LJ. 913, 918-43 (1983).

296.
(1976).
297.
298.
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Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 360 (1979); Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 525
Taylor, 419 U.S. at 525; Duren, 439 U.S. at 368-70.
Taylor, 419 U.S. at 534-35.
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the Court struck down the statute as unconstitutional.299 Since
even Chief Justice William Rehnquist has asserted that
gender-based classifications require a "sharper focus" than rational
basis scrutiny," gender-based peremptory challenges must raise
Fourteenth Amendment difficulties. This "sharper focus," or
intermediate scrutiny, requires that litigants refrain from using
overbroad generalizations based on gender when exercising
peremptory challenges.
C. Heightened Scrutiny and the Batson Challenge
Peremptory challenges based on race, ethnicity and gender may
violate the Fourteenth Amendmerit because of the heightened
judicial scrutiny required by these classifications. The Fourteenth
Amendment declares that no state may deny persons "[t]he equal
protection of the laws." '' This clause requires the courts to
review any state's legislation to ensure that statutes advance a
legitimate state interest. 0 2 A statute will satisfy the Equal

Protection Clause if it is "[r]ationally related to a legitimate state
interest., 30 3 Courts must deny an equal protection claim if the
statute in question bears so much as a "theoretical connection" with
the state interest.
When the statute or practice in question
involves a suspect classification, however, the Fourteenth
Amendment requires a closer relationship between the statute and
30
the state interest.
299. 1&Lat 533-35. Note that in an earlier case, Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961), the Court
had ruled that a Florida statute, similar to that in Taylor,passed an equal protection challenge because
it satisfied rational basis scrutiny. This case, however, predated the earliest application of heightened
scrutiny for gender discrimination in Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
300. Michael M. v. Sonoma County Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464, 468 (1981).
301. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
302. See, e.g., Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949).
303. New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976).
304. Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 463 (1981).
305. There are numerous types of suspect classifications. See, e.g., City of Clebume v. Clebume
Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (mental illness); Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973)
(alienage); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (gender); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968), Glona
v. American Guar. and Liab. Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73 (1968) (marital status of parents); Korematsu v.
United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (ethnicity). These do not include certain classifications. See, e.g.,
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (sexual preference); Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v.
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As applied to peremptory challenges, the Fourteenth
Amendment requires that courts assess the purpose of the
challenges and the relationship between the purpose and the actual
practice of exercising challenges. Peremptory challenges promote
an impartial jury trial. By permitting each side to exclude jurors
without explanation, a court eliminates jurors with extreme biases.
Each side excludes unfavorable venire persons, leaving only neutral
jurors. The rationality of this system depends upon at least a
theoretical relationship between the challenges and the attitudes of
the jurors.3 "6 If attorneys exercised peremptory challenges at
random, without regard to the possibility of bias or prejudice, then
the system of peremptory challenges would be an arbitrary exercise
of state power against the venire persons. It would then,
presumably, violate the equal protection rights of the venire
persons. The Court considers the peremptory challenge as a rational
means of creating an impartial jury.307 Under ordinary
circumstances then, the peremptory challenge passes scrutiny under
the Fourteenth Amendment.
When an attorney uses challenges based on a suspect
classification, however, the analysis changes. Such classifications
might provide a reasonable, but weak proxy for juror bias. Black
jurors might not, for example, always favor black plaintiffs in civil
rights claims; they might even make better jurors for the defense.
An attorney for the defense, however, may still strike such jurors
and defend the practice as rational. Not all black venire persons
will favor the plaintiff, but the attorney can defend the belief that

Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976) (age); San Antonio Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (wealth).

306. In 1975, Zeisel and Diamond conducted an empirical test of rationality of peremptory
challenges. Hans Zeisel & Shari S. Diamond, The Effect of Peremptory Challenges on Jury and
Verdict:An Experiment in FederalDistrictCourt,30 STAN. L. REv. 491 (1978). In this study, Zeisel
and Diamond asked those venire persons excluded during voir dire to witness the trial they would
have sat on as jurors had they not been challenged. After the trial, Zeisel and Diamond polled the
jurors. They discovered that although some of the attorneys eliminated jurors who would have found
against them at trial, others had worsened their position by eliminating favorable jurors. Id. at 513-18.
The effect could have resulted from differential abilities of the attorneys, but Zeisel and Diamond
note that it could also occur if attorneys as a group have no ability to spot bias, and merely strike
jurors at random. Id at 517-18. Peremptory challenges may, in theory, promote neutral juries, but
the above illustrates that they have failed an important empirical test.
307. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 219-22 (1965).
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some might as a rational belief. Thus, the challenge can increase
the likelihood of having a neutral jury, and pass a rational basis
test. The strike would not, however, satisfy a higher level of
scrutiny. For example, the assertion that black jurors will favor
black defendants rests on an untested hypothesis which is likely to
be false. Furthermore, a juror's race is, at best, a weak predictor of
verdict choice."' 8 The correlation between race and verdict in any
case will be unable to satisfy the requirements of heightened
scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause. In the case of suspect
classifications like race, ethnicity and gender, the heightened
scrutiny deprives the peremptory challenge of its legislative
justification.
But, does an attack on peremptory challenges really require
heightened scrutiny? Since jury service constitutes an important
element of civic responsibility, 3" perhaps individuals should not
be denied access on an arbitrary basis. Secondly, constitutional
rights other than the Equal Protection Clause can raise questions
about peremptory challenges. In particular, litigants who routinely
strike jurors because of their marital status or religious persuasion,
invoke their own brands of heightened scrutiny. Finally, the
systematic use of peremptory challenges to circumvent other
constitutional restrictions on challenges for cause, might raise
difficulties. 310 Even beyond the Equal Protection Clause alone,
peremptory challenges may raise other constitutional issues that the
Court has yet to address.

308. In one of the most extensive mock trial studies, race of jurors failed to predict verdict
choice. HASTIE Er AL., supranote 192, at 129-31. These researchers used a -generic" criminal case,
and observed that had they used a trial which inspired more polarized community sentiment, they
might have found that some of the characteristics they analyzed would have predicted verdict choice.
In the abstract, however, race does not predict verdicts. Conversely, in a specific case where racial
tensions run high, race might correlate highly with verdict.
309. See, e.g., Powers v. Ohio, 111 S. Ct. 1364, 1368 (1992) ('the opportunity for ordinary
citizens to participate in the administration ofjustice has long been recognized as one of the principal
justifications for retaining the jury system") (citing Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 147-58
(1968)); Id. at 1369 ("with the exception of voting, for most citizens, the honor and privilege of jury
duty is their most significant opportunity to participate in the democratic process-).
310. Batson used specific language on this point. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 88 (1986)
("the state may not draw up its jury lists pursuant to neutral procedures but then resort to
discrimination at later stages in the selection process").
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1. Classifications Which do not Raise Heightened Scrutiny
The Court's recent expansion of constitutional claims against
peremptory challenges may have created a mechanism for
protecting the right to serve on a jury. Twenty years ago, in Carter
v. Jury Commissioner of Greene County,3 ' the Court declared
jury service an important aspect of participation in the democratic
process, almost equivalent to voting. Furthermore, the Court has
repeatedly attacked jury venires which underrepresent various age
and economic groups. In an early case, Thiel v. Southern Pacific
Company,312 the Court condemned the deliberate exclusion of
blue collar workers from jury lists. In Thiel, a clerk had excluded
blue collar workers from jury lists on the grounds that they would
otherwise be summarily excused for reasons of financial
hardship.313 Although the clerk had a rational basis for excluding
blue collar workers, the Court rejected the practice as a violation
of the jurors' rights to serve. 314 Taken together, Carter, Thiel, and
the discussion of community harm in Powers"5 suggest that jury
service is a fundamental right which a state may not restrict
arbitrarily.
This implies that any form of SJS would be unconstitutional.
SJS always depends upon statistical generalizations about groups.
Such generalizations have sufficient support to pass rational basis
scrutiny, but not the more rigorous scrutiny which would be
required if they implicated a fundamental right. Thus, if jury
service is a fundamental right, then SJS, and indeed, any
peremptory challenge, becomes difficult to justify.
Another line of cases suggests otherwise. A number of courts
have faced jury venires drawn from lists which exclude persons

311. 396 U.S. 320 (1970). The Court explained: "Whetherjury service be deemed to be a right,
a privilege or a duty, the State may no more extend it to some of its citizens and deny it to others

on racial grounds than it may invidiously discriminate in the offering and withholding of the elective
franchise.
312.
313.
314.
315.
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Idl at 330.
328 U.S. 217, 222-25 (1946).
Id at 222.
Id at 223-25.
Powers v. Ohio, 1 I1 S. Ct. 1364, 1368 (1991).
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with last names beginning with certain letters of the alphabet. 6
Despite Thiel's declaration concerning the importance of jury
service, all three courts ruled that the random exclusion was not of
constitutional significance. In one of these cases, Walker v.
Goldsmith,317 the Court determined that for the purposes of jury
service, a cognizable class is defined as one "[w]hich in some
objectively discernible and significant way is distinct from the rest
of society, and whose interest cannot be adequately represented by
other members of the . . . jury panel." This suggests that equal
protection is not an issue in these cases. If such exclusion raises
Fourteenth Amendment rights, the cases would turn on whether the
groups had been deliberately excluded. As it stands, even Walker,
the post-Batson surname case, restricts its discussion to the nature
of the group excluded. The Walker court reasons that since the
excluded persons do not have distinct interests, their elimination
does not raise an equal protection claim."' Unlike the blue collar
workers in Thiel, persons whose last names begin with certain
letters do not share interests which cannot be represented by others
who ultimately serve on the jury.
Furthermore, Thiel and its progeny involve attacks on the
composition of the venire, not the jury. Exclusion of a group from
the venire results in the wholesale elimination of that group from
all juries within the jurisdiction. Exclusion during voir dire prevents
an individual from serving in only a single trial. Absent an attempt
to subvert voir dire into a mechanism for systematic exclusion,319
the excluded venire persons have been denied nothing. They may
serve on future juries. Individual jurors have the right to serve on

316.

See Walker v. Goldsmith, 902 F.2d 16 (9th Cir. 1990) (W-Z excluded); United States v.

Puleo, 817 F.2d 702. 706 (11th Cir.), cert denied, 484 U.S. 978 (1987) (M-Z excluded); Krause v.

Chattier, 406 F.2d 898, 901 (1stCir. 1968), cert.denied, 395 U.S. 960 (1969) (T-Z excluded). In all
three cases, a clerk mistakenly excluded these persons from the selected pool.
317. Walker, 902 F.2d at 18 (quoting United States v. Potter, 552 F.2d 901, 904 (9th Cir.
1977)).
318. The court notes that it has researched the possibility that members of society with certain
last names suffer from common psychological difficulties which one school psychologist refers to
as "alphabetic neurosis." Id. at 16 n.1 (citing Joseph W. Autry & Donald G. Barker, Academic
Correlatesof Alphabetic Order of Surname, 8 J. ScH. PSYCHOL. 22, 22 (1970)).
319. See, e.g., State v. Brown, 371 So. 2d 751 (La. 1979); State v. Washington, 375 So. 2d
1162 (La. 1979).
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a jury, but not to serve on a particular jury. Batson, Edmonson, and
Powers further grant venire persons the right to not face exclusion
20
on the basis of their race.1
2. Jury Service and Other ConstitutionalRights
Creating a minimal right to jury service can create problems
beyond the Equal Protection Clause. When demanding race neutral
explanations, trial judges have found themselves faced with
explanations based on the religious practice, marital status, or
political affiliation of the venire persons.32 Both religious
practice and marital status have found favor as fundamental rights
guaranteed by the Constitution, at least in nonjury contexts.322
Since both lines of precedent forbid a state from denying a
privilege or right to an individual because of their religious
practices or their marital status, a juror ought to be able to assert
these claims. Striking jurors based on their political affiliations also
raises penumbra free speech rights.
As with the equal protection claims, a complaint by a venire
person based on any of these rights is extremely unlikely. At this
time, no court has recognized third party standing for litigants to
raise the First Amendment claims or penumbra constitutional rights
of excluded venire persons. Indeed, dicta in the Batson case
suggests that the Batson claim is restricted to standing for equal

320. See supra notes 98-136 and accompanying text.
321. United States v. Thomas, 914 F.2d 139 (8th Cir. 1990) (venire person struck because he
belonged to the same religion as the defendant); United States v. Clemmons, 892 F.2d 1153 (3d Cir.
1989) (venire person struck because he was "Asian-Indian and probably Hindu"); United States v.
Clemens, 843 F.2d 741 (3d Cir. 1988) (prosecutor liked to use challenges against young, single
venire persons); United States v. Nicholson, 885 F.2d 481 (8th Cir. 1989) (prosecutor expressed
preference for older, married, male jurors); United States v. Prine, 909 F.2d 1109 (8th Cir. 1990)
(prosecution tried to eliminate all young, unmarried venire persons); United States v. Hughes, 911
F.2d 113 (8th Cir. 1990) (prosecutor challenged individual because he was young, single and shabbily
dressed); United States v Jackson, 914 F.2d 1050 (8th Cir. 1990) (venire persons excluded because
they were young and single).
322. See, e.g., Thomas v. Review Bd. of the Indiana Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707
(1981) (state may not deny individuals employment benefits as a result of their religious persuasion);
Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (state may not deny right to marry); Loving v. Virginia 388
U.S. 1 (1967) (state may not prohibit interracial marriage); Sherbert v. Vemner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
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protection.323 The Court distinguished third party standing for
equal protection from standing to raise Fourth Amendment rights
in cases of juror surveillance. 324 Thus, although such a claim is
possible, it has yet to find widespread acceptance.
The Fifth Circuit, in United States v. Greer,"5 has construed
the 1991 trilogy of Supreme Court cases as extending Batson to
peremptory challenges exercised on the basis of religious
practice.326 Facing a charge for civil rights violations against
members of the Jewish community, the defendant requested that the
judge inquire into the religious practices of each venire person.327
The trial judge refused.328 In denying the defendant's appeal, the
Fifth Circuit stated that even if the defendant had learned which
329
jurors were Jewish, he could not have used the information.
The court concluded that Edmonson, Hernandez, and Powers
prohibit peremptory challenges on the basis of "race, religion, and
national origin. '330 The Fifth Circuit did not discuss the origins
of its ban on peremptory challenges based on religion other than a
string citation to Batson and its recent progeny.
Even without a line of precedent to support it, the Greer court's
analysis of religious-based peremptory challenges is probably
correct.33 ' In practice, the Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment has created heightened scrutiny for statutes which
discriminate against members of a religion. 32 In Sherbert v.
Verner,333 the Court asserted that a statute which impedes the
free exercise of religion must be justified by a "compelling state
interest ' 334 and that "no showing of a rational relationship to a

323. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 97-98 (1986).
324. l. at 89.
325. 939 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1991).
326. Ia&at 1084-87.
327. 1d. at 1084.
328. Id.
329. Id. at 1085.
330. Id. at 1086.
331. Although one older case condemns inquiry into the religious practices of venire persons,
it failed to generate a line of precedent. Gideon v. United States, 52 F.2d 427 (8th Cir. 1931).
332. See, e.g., Ely, supra note 198, at 100.
333. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
334. Id. at 403.
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colorable state interest would suffice. ' 33 5 With scrutiny similar to
racial classifications, religious based peremptory challenges must
violate constitutional rights of the venire persons. As with race,
religion may have some relationship with the prejudices of the
venire persons, but the relationship is less than perfect. Also, the
voir dire process obviates any need to use religion as a proxy for
suspected prejudice.336
Marital status and political affiliation cases raise similar issues.
In Zablocki v. Redhail,337 the Court struck down a Wisconsin
statute which required that certain individuals obtain judicial
permission before they could re-marry. 38 The majority declared
that since the statute interfered with a fundamental right, "[ilt
cannot be upheld unless it is supported by sufficiently important
state interests and is closely tailored to effectuate only those
interests." 339 Similarly, in a line of First Amendment cases, the
Supreme Court has held that individuals may not be punished for
mere membership in a group.340 If a court should determine that
the First Amendment requires heightened scrutiny for group
membership and exclusion from jury service, then peremptory
challenges based on such membership cannot stand. As with the
cases involving race and gender, heightened scrutiny of
classifications which infringe upon marital status and political
affiliation can also deprive peremptory challenges of their
legitimate purpose.
Although no precedent exists to support the interaction between
Batson and the right to marry, the Fifth Circuit, in Greer, has ruled
that Batson permits claims based on the Fourteenth

335. Id at 406.
336. But see supra note 134 (discussing relevant peremptory challenge issues).
337. 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
338. rd at 377.
339. Id at 388. But see Califano v. Jobst, 434 U.S. 47 (1977) (applying rational basis review
to a scheme which terminated benefits received by a disabled dependent child when that child

marries).
340. See, e.g., DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937) (defendant may not be convicted
merely for organizing a meeting of the Communist Party); N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449

(1958) (Alabama may not compel the N.A.A.C.P. to disclose its membership lists).
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Amendment.34

Once the Court gave standing to litigants to

defend the rights of venire persons, the door was opened to such
claims. The heightened scrutiny demanded by the Free Expression
Clause deprives a religious based peremptory challenge of its
purpose. With the expanded rights to jury service, peremptory
challenges based on marriage or political orientation might face a
new future. Such an expansion would make further inroads against
SJS.
3. Non-Suspect ClassificationsBased on Shared Attitudes
Other classifications, which do not require heightened scrutiny
from either the Fourteenth Amendment or other constitutional
rights, probably do not raise difficulties for peremptory challenges.
Litigants frequently make assumptions concerning the biases held
by jurors based on other classifications, such as expressed attitudes.
Like race-based classifications, attitude distinctions are an indicator,
albeit imperfect, of bias. As with racial classifications, if these
predictions have no basis in reality, then these distinctions will
result in the arbitrary exclusion of certain individuals from jury
service. The attitude classifications will not, however, result in a
Fourteenth Amendment violation. Since attitude classifications do
have at least a theoretical basis, they will be sufficient to pass the
Fourteenth Amendment's rational basis test.
In Lockhart v. McCree,342 the Supreme Court made it clear
that classifications based on shared attitudes in jury selection do
not raise Fourteenth Amendment's heightened scrutiny.343 In
Lockhart, the Court upheld a jury selection system which excluded
venire persons who stated that they could never sentence a
convicted felon to death during the guilt phase of a capital jury
trial. 34 These jurors, called "Witherspoon Excludables, '' 345 do

341.
342.

939 F.2d 1076, 1085 (5th Cir. 1991).
476 U.S. 162 (1986).

343. Id at 164.
344. Id at 183-84.
345. So named because of Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968), the Supreme Court
case which initially sanctioned this procedure.
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not constitute a cognizable class. The Court held that "groups
defined solely in terms of shared attitudes that would prevent or
substantially impair members of the group from performing their
duties as jurors . . . are not 'distinctive groups."' 346 Thus, it
would seem that groups formed by shared attitudes do not raise
equal protection difficulties.
In a post-Lockhart case, the Third Circuit added a qualification
to this holding. In United States v. Salamone,347 the court
overturned the conviction of a defendant for violating federal gun
control laws. 348 At trial, the judge excluded for cause those venire

persons who belong to the National Rifle Association (N.R.A.)

a

The trial judge justified the exclusion by citing the N.R.A.'s
opposition to gun control laws and advocacy of civil disobedience
in gun control. 350 The trial judge assumed that the N.R.A.
members would not follow the law in deciding the case.351 The
Third Circuit condemned this assumption, holding that "juror
competence is an individual, rather than a group or class
matter. 352 The Court expressed concern that "[t]aken to its
logical conclusion, the government position would permit exclusion
of N.A.A.C.P. members from cases seeking enforcement of civil
rights statutes, Moral Majority activists from pornography cases,
Catholics from cases involving abortion clinic protests, member of
N.O.W. from sex discrimination cases, and subscribers to
353
Consumer Reports from cases involving products liabilities.
The difference between Salamone and its parade of horribles, and
Lockhart is that in Lockhart,the trial judge eliminated Witherspoon
excludables because these venire persons specifically stated that
they would ignore judicial instructions, thereby rendering them
incompetent to serve as jurors. In Salamone, the trial judge inferred

346.
347.
348.
349.
350.
351.
352.
353.
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Lockhart, 476 U.S. at 176-77.
800 F.2d 1216 (3d Cir. 1986).
Id at 1217.
Id at 1218.
Id. at 1221.
Id
Id. at 1226 (quoting Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 220 (1946)).
Id at 1225.
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incompetence from group membership. Thiel and the right to serve
on juries forbids a trial judge from making such an inference.
While a trial court may not issue a challenge for cause, a
litigant may exercise a peremptory challenge. In fact, the Third
Circuit's N.R.A. members would probably not have served on the
ultimate jury even if the trial judge had refused to exclude them.
Instead of exclusion by the court, they would have faced exclusion
by the prosecutor. Similarly, the members of the N.A.A.C.P., the
Moral Majority, N.O.W., and the Catholic Church, along with the
subscribers to Consumer Reports probably also have little or no
chance of actually serving on juries in the cases described in
Salamone. As the Third Circuit noted, when a judge makes an
inference of bias based on group membership, it skews the
selection process. 4 When a litigant makes the assumption,
however, it furthers the creation of jury in a fair, neutral selection
process. Once again, the relationship between the membership in

a group and bias may be quite good, but it is less than perfect. The
peremptory challenges based on these assumptions will survive a
rational basis test, but not strict scrutiny.
The Supreme Court has not explicitly addressed the level of
scrutiny to be applied to groups with shared attitudes in jury
selection cases, but the Lockhart opinion provides some
illumination. Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority in
Lockhart, observed that exclusion of attitude groups results from
"an attribute that is within the individual's control," 355 thereby
distinguishing it from the exclusion of other groups such as
"blacks, women, and Mexican-Americans. 356 Also, Rehnquist
noted that the elimination of Witherspoon excludables "does not
prevent them from serving as jurors on other criminal cases, and
thus leads to no substantial deprivation of their basic rights of
citizenship. '357 Similarly, a peremptory challenge against an
N.R.A. member would not deny their basic right to serve on a jury.

354.
355.
356.
357.

Id at 1229.
Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 176 (1986).
Id.
Id. at 176.
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The Fourteenth Amendment does not forbid the prosecutor in
Salamone from assuming that the N.R.A. members are biased. Such
a rule would have to arise from some other right because the rights
of citizenship justify service on juries in general, but do not
guarantee service on a specific jury.
In many respects, the distinction between the elimination of the
N.R.A. members for cause and by a peremptory challenge is
arbitrary. At least one lower court has heard a case addressing this
issue. In Brown v. Dixon,358 the Fourth Circuit overturned a
district court judge's efforts to meld Witherspoon with Batson.359
As part of the death qualification process in the case, the district
court inquired into the attitudes among venire persons towards the
death penalty during voir dire proceedings. 3" Following rulings
in Witherspoon v. Illinois and Lockhart v. McCree, the judge
excluded jurors for cause who stated that they were so opposed to
the death penalty that they would never vote to impose it, but
refused to exclude jurors for mere opposition to the death
penalty.361 The prosecutor in Brown proceeded to use his
peremptory challenges against the nine remaining venire persons
who expressed opposition to the death penalty.362 Citing Batson,
the judge asserted that the prosecutor could not accomplish with
peremptory challenges what Witherspoon would not allow him to
do with challenges for cause, and the judge ordered renewed
proceedings.363 In overturning this ruling, the Fourth Circuit
relied on the significance attached to peremptory challenges by the
Supreme Court in Swain v. Alabama.3" Arguing that since the
peremptory challenge has an important role in creating an impartial
jury, Brown held that courts may not delve into the motivations for
those peremptory challenges based on the attitudes of the venire
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persons.365 The Fourth Circuit declared that to rule otherwise
would end the peremptory challenge. 6 The prosecution, or any
litigant, may exercise peremptory challenges when the Constitution
prevents a judge from doing so simply because the prosecution
may make assumptions that a trial judge may not. The trial judge's
assumptions can only skew a case, and fulfill no state purpose. The
litigant's assumptions, whether arising from SJS or intuition,
however, further selection of a neutral jury. Unless the Equal
Protection Clause forbids the assumption, the litigant's peremptory
challenge furthers the state interest in creating a neutral jury.
To sum up the state of peremptory challenges after the 1990
term, the Supreme Court has forbidden the use of peremptory
challenges against groups when they require heightened scrutiny
under the Fourteenth Amendment. This includes peremptory
challenges based on race, national origin and gender. Through the
First Amendment, this prohibition might also include religious
practice and membership in a group that raises freedom of
association claims. The analysis of peremptory challenges against
members of groups which implicate penumbra constitutional rights
such as marital status and political affiliation depends upon the
continued treatment given to such rights in the Supreme Court.
This system leaves a wide variety of peremptory challenges intact,
including those based on shared attitudes, age or occupation. A
court may not draw up jury lists which impinge upon the right to
serve among certain occupations or attitude groups. It must,
however, tolerate peremptory challenges against these groups, since
they further the neutral selection process.
VI. THE FUTURE/CONCLUSIONS
As long as the Court avoids taking Justice Marshall's
367
suggestion that it eliminate peremptory challenges altogether,
SJS retains a place in modem litigation practice. The courts allow
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peremptory challenges against jurors who hold unfavorable
attitudes or perspectives. To the extent that SJS consultants use voir
dire questions to uncover attitudes they will be less likely to

trample on the Equal Protection Clause. As tempting a shortcut that
overt characteristics like race and gender might be to an SJS
consultant, reliance on those characteristics only jeopardizes their
clients.
Despite its conservative leanings, the current Supreme Court
seems to be committed to expanding the scope of protection of
venire persons from invidious discrimination. 68 Although it
arises from benign motives, SJS's traditional emphasis on
immutable demographic characteristics mimics the bigotry in jury
selection that the Court condemns. Until the 1990 Supreme Court
term, this mimicry cast an ethical cloud over SJS, but did not
endanger its use. Now, however, SJS consultants must confront
their past. No longer is their advice harmless, and possibly useful.
One law and psychology scholar, describes SJS as "one way to cut
chances to a minimum. ,36' Even if it "cuts chances," ss now
creates the risk of judicial sanction and needless appeals. It creates
the risk of extending voir dire proceedings and can even create the
basis for an appeal. SJS can still assist attorneys, but like most trial
strategies, a litigant must weigh its benefits against its possible
liabilities.370

368. Edmonson was a 6-3 decision; Powers was 7-2. Only 5 Justices actually supported the
McCollhm holding.
369. Gray, supra note 2, at 149 (quoting Bruce Sales).
370. See, e.g., Horowitz, supra note 5, at 88.
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